GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in @jsonbored/gittensory-mcp. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Gittensory: Missing contributor-scoped access control on profile endpoint and MCP tool leaks miner financial data
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.
@jsonbored/gittensory-mcpnpmDescription
Summary
GET /v1/contributors/:login/profile and the gittensory_get_contributor_profile MCP tool skip the contributor-scoped access check that every sibling endpoint enforces. Any authenticated session/API/MCP token holder can read any contributor's profile; for confirmed Gittensor miners that exposes alphaPerDay, taoPerDay, usdPerDay (and the hotkey on the REST path). Authenticated cross-contributor disclosure, CWE-284 / IDOR.
Details
In src/api/routes.ts the profile handler returns buildContributorProfile(...) with no requireContributorAccess call. Every sibling (/decision-pack, /repos/:owner/:repo/decision, etc.) gates and 403s on a cross-contributor request — the profile route is the only omission. buildContributorProfile (src/signals/engine.ts) embeds hotkey and the three *PerDay fields for any confirmed miner.
The MCP tool getContributorProfile (src/mcp/server.ts) also omits requireContributorAccess. Its redactSensitiveForMcp filter only strips keys matching hotkey|coldkey|wallet|private_key|privateKey|mnemonic, so the hotkey is dropped but alphaPerDay/taoPerDay/usdPerDay pass through.
The codebase treats these as secret everywhere else — decision-pack.ts destructures the hotkey out before serving, and three sanitizers scrub hotkey/wallet from AI/comment output — which is why this is an oversight, not by-design.
Exposure: REST → hotkey + 3 financial fields; MCP → 3 financial fields (hotkey redacted).
PoC
- Get any valid session/API/MCP token.
- Pick a target
loginthat is a confirmed miner. GET /v1/contributors/{target}/profile→ 200 withgittensor.hotkey,alphaPerDay,taoPerDay,usdPerDay.GET /v1/contributors/{target}/decision-pack(same token) → 403, proving the missing gate.- MCP
gittensory_get_contributor_profilewith{target}→ result includes the three*PerDayfields.
Impact
Any token holder can enumerate other miners' daily TAO/alpha/USD revenue (plus hotkey via REST) without authorization. All miners with snapshot data are affected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @jsonbored/gittensory-mcp | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @jsonbored/gittensory-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of @jsonbored/gittensory-mcp has shipped for GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-382c-vx95-w3p5 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.