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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf — nimiq-blockchain

HIGHFix: nimiq/core-rs-albatross#3772

GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-193 vulnerability in nimiq-blockchain. A fix is available for nimiq-blockchain — see the affected versions and patch details below.

nimiq-blockchain: Validity store off by one error

Also known asCVE-2026-46369
Published
Aug 12, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 27, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀nimiq-blockchain

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The validity store treats a transaction with stored block_number = X as "in window" only when X > last_bn - transaction_validity_window_blocks (strict inequality). However the protocol's Transaction::is_valid_at accepts a transaction for inclusion in any block in [validity_start_height - blocks_per_batch, validity_start_height + window - 1]. By choosing validity_start_height = X + blocks_per_batch (the largest value still compatible with first inclusion at block X), an attacker can replay the same signed transaction in any block B such that X + window < B < validity_start_height + window, i.e., a contiguous window of blocks_per_batch - 1 blocks (59 on MainNet, ~10 minutes) during which the replay-protection check fails to flag it. The same transaction is then executed twice: the sender is debited twice, the recipient credited twice.

Patches

https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3772

Workarounds

No known workarounds

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ionimiq-blockchainall versions1.5.1cargo update -p nimiq-blockchain --precise 1.5.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nimiq-blockchain, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update nimiq-blockchain to 1.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The validity store treats a transaction with stored `block_number = X` as "in window" only when `X > last_bn - transaction_validity_window_blocks` (strict inequality). However the protocol's `Transaction::is_valid_at` accepts a transaction for inclusion in any block in `[validity_start_height - blocks_per_batch, validity_start_height + window - 1]`. By choosing `validity_start_height = X + blocks_per_batch` (the largest value still compatible with first inclusion at block X), an attacker can replay the same signed transaction in any block B such that `X + window < B < validity_start
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf in your dependencies?

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GHSA-3763-qp59-59vf: nimiq (High 7.5) | O3 Security