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GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j

GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j is a XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability in org.verapdf:validation-model. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

veraPDF Validation XXE via XFA

Also known asCVE-2026-54079
Published
Jul 29, 2026
Updated
Jul 29, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk24th percentile0.00%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
org.verapdf:validation-modelorg.verapdf:validation-modelorg.verapdf:validation-model-jakartaorg.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Description An XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation.

Details

The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java within the getdynamicRender() method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF's /AcroForm dictionary, decodes the embedded XML stream, and parses it to extract the <dynamicRender> element value.

The vulnerability stems from the use of a default-configured DocumentBuilderFactory to parse fully attacker-controlled XML:

  • The factory is created via DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance() with no security features enabled. disallow-doctype-decl, external-general-entities, external-parameter-entities, and FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING are all left at their insecure defaults.
  • The input passed to builder.parse() is the decoded /XFA stream taken directly from the untrusted PDF.
  • The text content of the <dynamicRender> node is returned to the validation model. Note that the shipped PDF/UA-1 rule (dynamicRender != 'required') consumes this value but does not echo it into the report output, so reliable exfiltration requires the out-of-band parameter-entity technique described under Impact rather than in-band reflection.

Impact

This impacts all current releases of the veraPDF validation-model module.

Successful exploitation requires only that the target validate an attacker-supplied PDF against the PDF/UA-1 profile (or via flavour auto-detection on a PDF that declares PDF/UA-1 conformance), since getdynamicRender() is invoked by the dynamicRender != 'required' rule in the bundled PDF/UA-1 profile. No additional configuration or operator action is required.

Proposed Patch

Harden the DocumentBuilderFactory in validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java per the OWASP XXE Prevention Cheat Sheet to disallow DOCTYPE outright.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.verapdf:validation-model1.17.35&&< 1.30.21.30.2
Mavenorg.verapdf:validation-model1.31.1&&< 1.31.711.31.71
Mavenorg.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta1.17.35&&< 1.30.21.30.2
Mavenorg.verapdf:validation-model-jakarta1.31.1&&< 1.31.711.31.71

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.verapdf:validation-model. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.verapdf:validation-model to 1.30.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary **Description** An XML External Entity Injection (CWE-611) vulnerability in veraPDF allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server file system and perform Server-Side Request Forgery by submitting a crafted PDF containing a malicious XFA stream. This affects all current versions of veraPDF-validation. ## Details The vulnerability resides in veraPDF-validation `validation-model/src/main/java/org/verapdf/gf/model/impl/pd/GFPDAcroForm.java` within the `getdynamicRender()` method. This method retrieves the /XFA entry from the PDF's /AcroForm dictionary, decod
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-36mm-w85j-3q2j across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.