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GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg

AVideo has Plaintext Video Password Storage

Also known asCVE-2026-33867
Published
Mar 26, 2026
Updated
Mar 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk5th percentile+0.14%
0.00%0.22%0.43%0.65%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

AVideo allows content owners to password-protect individual videos. The video password is stored in the database in plaintext — no hashing, salting, or encryption is applied. If an attacker gains read access to the database (via SQL injection, a database backup, or misconfigured access controls), they obtain all video passwords in cleartext.

Details

File: objects/video.php

Vulnerable setter:

public function setVideo_password($video_password)
{
    AVideoPlugin::onVideoSetVideo_password($this->id, $this->video_password, $video_password);
    $this->video_password = trim($video_password);
}

Vulnerable getter:

public function getVideo_password()
{
    if (empty($this->video_password)) {
        return '';
    }
    return trim($this->video_password);
}

The value assigned to $this->video_password is only trim()-ed before being persisted to the database column video_password in the videos table. There is no call to any hashing function (e.g., password_hash(), sha256, or similar).

When a visitor enters a password to access a protected video, the comparison is done directly against the stored plaintext:

// Comparison at access check:
if ($video->getVideo_password() === $_POST['password']) { ... }

This means:

  1. Any database read (SQL injection, backup leak, hosting panel access) exposes all video passwords as cleartext.
  2. Video passwords are often reused by users across other services, making this a credential harvesting risk.
  3. The plaintext value is also present in application memory and any query logs.

PoC

  1. Set a password on any video via the AVideo admin/creator UI.
  2. Query the database: SELECT clean_title, video_password FROM videos WHERE video_password != '';
  3. All video passwords are returned in plaintext — no cracking required.

Alternatively, exploit any of the SQL injection vulnerabilities already reported in this repository to extract the video_password column directly.

Impact

  • Type: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information (CWE-312)
  • Severity: High
  • Authentication required: No — any database read access (including via SQL injection by unauthenticated users) exposes all passwords
  • Impact: Full exposure of all video access passwords; credential reuse attacks against users who share passwords across services
  • Fix: Hash video passwords on write using password_hash($video_password, PASSWORD_BCRYPT) and verify on read using password_verify($_POST['password'], $stored_hash)

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistwwbn/avideoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary AVideo allows content owners to password-protect individual videos. The video password is stored in the database in **plaintext** — no hashing, salting, or encryption is applied. If an attacker gains read access to the database (via SQL injection, a database backup, or misconfigured access controls), they obtain all video passwords in cleartext. ### Details **File:** `objects/video.php` **Vulnerable setter:** ```php public function setVideo_password($video_password) { AVideoPlugin::onVideoSetVideo_password($this->id, $this->video_password, $video_password); $this->video
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-363v-5rh8-23wg across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.