GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-436 vulnerability in github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Fiber's cache middleware default key generator ignores query string, causing response mix-up across distinct query parameters
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 356,453 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Fiber cache middleware's default key generator uses only c.Path() and does not include the query string.
As a result, requests like /?id=1 and /?id=2 can map to the same cache key and share the same cached response.
This can cause response mix-up (cache poisoning-like behavior) for endpoints where response content depends on query parameters.
Details
Default configuration in cache middleware:
KeyGenerator: func(c fiber.Ctx) string { return utils.CopyString(c.Path()) }
References:
- https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/config.go#L90-L92
- https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/cache_test.go#L599-L621
The existing test demonstrates that when handler output depends on query parameter id, a second request with a different query still returns the first cached response (cache hit), confirming query is not part of the default cache key.
PoC
Minimal PoC:
package main
import (
"log"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3/middleware/cache"
)
func main() {
app := fiber.New()
app.Use(cache.New()) // default config
app.Get("/", func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
return c.SendString(c.Query("id", "1"))
})
log.Fatal(app.Listen(":3000"))
}
Reproduction:
GET /?id=1- Cache miss
- Response body:
1
GET /?id=2- Cache hit
- Response body:
1(expected2)
Local verification command used:
go test ./middleware/cache -run Test_Cache_WithNoCacheRequestDirective -count=1
Observed result: test passes, confirming this is current behavior.
Impact
- Responses that should vary by query parameters can be mixed between requests.
- In real deployments, this may leak or corrupt user/tenant-specific content if query parameters influence context or data selection.
- This is deployment-dependent but security-relevant, and not safe-by-default for query-variant responses.
Suggested remediation
- Change default cache key generation to include path + normalized query string (or canonicalized original URL).
- Keep ability for custom key generators.
- Add explicit documentation warning that path-only keying is unsafe for query-dependent responses.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 | all versions | 3.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 to 3.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.