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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8

MEDIUMFix: gofiber/fiber@050ff1f

GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-436 vulnerability in github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fiber's cache middleware default key generator ignores query string, causing response mix-up across distinct query parameters

Also known asCVE-2026-30246GO-2026-5069
Published
Apr 28, 2026
Updated
Jul 24, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.75%0.0%0.3%0.3%0.3%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 356,453 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Fiber cache middleware's default key generator uses only c.Path() and does not include the query string. As a result, requests like /?id=1 and /?id=2 can map to the same cache key and share the same cached response.

This can cause response mix-up (cache poisoning-like behavior) for endpoints where response content depends on query parameters.

Details

Default configuration in cache middleware:

  • KeyGenerator: func(c fiber.Ctx) string { return utils.CopyString(c.Path()) }

References:

The existing test demonstrates that when handler output depends on query parameter id, a second request with a different query still returns the first cached response (cache hit), confirming query is not part of the default cache key.

PoC

Minimal PoC:

package main

import (
    "log"

    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3/middleware/cache"
)

func main() {
    app := fiber.New()
    app.Use(cache.New()) // default config

    app.Get("/", func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
        return c.SendString(c.Query("id", "1"))
    })

    log.Fatal(app.Listen(":3000"))
}

Reproduction:

  1. GET /?id=1
    • Cache miss
    • Response body: 1
  2. GET /?id=2
    • Cache hit
    • Response body: 1 (expected 2)

Local verification command used:

go test ./middleware/cache -run Test_Cache_WithNoCacheRequestDirective -count=1

Observed result: test passes, confirming this is current behavior.

Impact

  • Responses that should vary by query parameters can be mixed between requests.
  • In real deployments, this may leak or corrupt user/tenant-specific content if query parameters influence context or data selection.
  • This is deployment-dependent but security-relevant, and not safe-by-default for query-variant responses.

Suggested remediation

  • Change default cache key generation to include path + normalized query string (or canonicalized original URL).
  • Keep ability for custom key generators.
  • Add explicit documentation warning that path-only keying is unsafe for query-dependent responses.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3all versions3.2.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3 to 3.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Fiber cache middleware's default key generator uses only `c.Path()` and does not include the query string. As a result, requests like `/?id=1` and `/?id=2` can map to the same cache key and share the same cached response. This can cause response mix-up (cache poisoning-like behavior) for endpoints where response content depends on query parameters. ### Details Default configuration in cache middleware: - `KeyGenerator: func(c fiber.Ctx) string { return utils.CopyString(c.Path()) }` References: - https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/middleware/cache/config.go#L90-L92 - htt
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-35hp-hqmv-8qg8: v3 (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security