How severe is GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr?

GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr affects the following packages: github.com/ossf/allstar (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr?

Update github.com/ossf/allstar to 0.0.0-20250721181116-e004ecb540d6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/ossf/allstar. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr?

GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is classified as CWE-453 (CWE-453), Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr was published on October 10, 2025 and was last updated on October 23, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr

Fix: ossf/allstar#713

GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is a CWE-453 vulnerability in github.com/ossf/allstar. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Allstar Reviewbot has Authentication Bypass via Hard-coded Webhook Secret

Also known asCVE-2025-61926GO-2025-4018

Published

Oct 10, 2025

Updated

Oct 23, 2025

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2025 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/ossf/allstar

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

A vulnerability in Allstar’s Reviewbot component caused inbound webhook requests to be validated against a hard-coded, shared secret:

https://github.com/ossf/allstar/blob/294ae985cc2facd0918e8d820e4196021aa0b914/pkg/reviewbot/reviewbot.go#L59

The value used for the secret token was compiled into the Allstar binary and could not be configured at runtime. In practice, this meant that every deployment using Reviewbot would validate requests with the same secret unless the operator modified source code and rebuilt the component - an expectation that is not documented and is easy to miss. While Reviewbot is not commonly enabled in standard Allstar setups, we are issuing this advisory to reach any environments where it may have been deployed.

Affected Versions

All Allstar releases prior to v4.5 that include the Reviewbot code path are affected. Deployments on v4.5 and later are not affected. If you have not enabled or exposed the Reviewbot endpoint, this issue does not apply to your installation.

Impact

If the Reviewbot endpoint is deployed and reachable, an attacker can bypass authentication by crafting webhook requests that use the known, hard-coded secret. Because signature verification will succeed, Reviewbot would treat these requests as authentic when they should be rejected. Depending on the permissions and automations attached to your deployment, this could allow unauthorized triggering of review actions such as posting automated comments or reviews, influencing checks, or otherwise manipulating repository signals. The primary risk is to the integrity of repository workflows rather than confidentiality or availability, although secondary effects (e.g., noisy automation, misleading reviews, or workflow disruptions) are possible.

Exploitability

Exploiting this is straightforward and does not require an attacker to be authenticated. Anyone who can send requests to the Reviewbot webhook can reach the vulnerable code.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/ossf/allstar`	all versions	0.0.0-20250721181116-e004ecb540d6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/ossf/allstar. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/ossf/allstar to 0.0.0-20250721181116-e004ecb540d6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

A vulnerability in Allstar’s Reviewbot component caused inbound webhook requests to be validated against a hard-coded, shared secret: https://github.com/ossf/allstar/blob/294ae985cc2facd0918e8d820e4196021aa0b914/pkg/reviewbot/reviewbot.go#L59 The value used for the secret token was compiled into the Allstar binary and could not be configured at runtime. In practice, this meant that every deployment using Reviewbot would validate requests with the same secret unless the operator modified source code and rebuilt the component - an expectation that is not documented and is easy to miss. While R

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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