GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc
Fix: ddnexus/pagy#908GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc is a Path Traversal vulnerability in pagy. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Pagy I18n locale option is not validated before being used in a file path
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
pagyReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Pagy::I18n.locale= did not validate its argument before using it as a
path component to load the matching dictionary file (<locale>.yml). An
application that assigns untrusted input to the locale — e.g. the common
pattern Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale] — let that input influence
which file Pagy attempted to load.
Details
The setter stored the value as-is, and the loader joined it into a path and read it:
# gem/lib/pagy/modules/i18n/i18n.rb
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s
end
# ...later, when translating:
path = pathnames.reverse.map { |p| p.join("#{locale}.yml") }.find(&:exist?)
dictionary = YAML.load_file(path)[locale]
Because the locale was used verbatim, a value such as an absolute path or
a ../-style string redirected the lookup outside the locales directory.
Pagy's subsequent structural check (dictionary['pagy']['p11n'])
prevents the file's contents from being returned, so this is not a
direct file read.
Fixed in 43.5.6 by constraining the locale to a BCP 47 shape before use:
LOCALE_PATTERN = /\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s[LOCALE_PATTERN]
end
Any non-matching value (including nil) resolves to the default locale
and never reaches the file lookup.
PoC
In an application that sets Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale], the
loader appends .yml and reads <locale>.yml, so the request param
controls the target path. For example, pointing it at the app's
config/database.yml:
- Send a request with
?locale=../../../config/database(adjust the number of../to reach the app root from the gem'slocales/directory). - Pagy calls
YAML.load_fileon the resulting…/config/database.yml. - The outcome differs by whether that
.ymlexists, is readable, parses as YAML, and has Pagy's expected structure — an existing, readableconfig/database.ymlraises a different error than a non-existent path (which silently falls back to the default locale). This yields a file-existence / readability oracle for.ymlpaths, and the targeted file is read into the process during the attempt.
Impact
Information disclosure (CWE-22 / CWE-200): a file-existence / readability
oracle for .yml paths on the host, plus a server-side read of
attacker-chosen files into the process. The file contents are not
returned in the response.
Only applications that pass unsanitized end-user input into
Pagy::I18n.locale= are affected. Applications that set the locale from
trusted values are not affected.
Patched: pagy 43.5.6.
Workaround (if you cannot upgrade): validate the locale before
assigning it, e.g.
Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale].to_s[/\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/],
or restrict it to your known set of locales.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | pagy | ≥ 43.0.0&&< 43.5.6 | 43.5.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pagy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update pagy to 43.5.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.