GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr — openc3
CRITICALGHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.6) CWE-250 vulnerability in openc3. A fix is available for openc3 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenC3 COSMOS: Permissions Bypass Provides User Access to Unassigned Administrative Actions via Script Runner Tool
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,238 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
openc3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Vulnerability Type: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges Attack type: Authenticated remote Impact: Data disclosure/manipulation, privilege escalation Affected components: The following docker images: • Openc3inc/openc3-COSMOS-script-runner-api
The Script Runner widget allows users to execute Python and Ruby scripts directly from the openc3-COSMOS-script-runner-api container. Because all the docker containers share a network, users can execute specially crafted scripts to bypass the API permissions check and perform administrative actions, including reading and modifying data inside the Redis database, which can be used to read secrets and change COSMOS settings, as well as read and write to the buckets service, which holds configuration, log, and plugin files. These actions are normally only available from the Admin Console or with administrative privileges. Any user with permission to create and run scripts can connect to any service in the docker network.
<img width="940" height="473" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bf524163-127d-4349-999b-cefc53d4374d" />Figure 1: Environment variables, including Redis credentials, found in the Script Runner container A Ruby script is used to expose the Redis username, password, hostname, and port. These credentials might also be found from the source code or through a brute-force attack.
<img width="940" height="507" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6d3ccad4-949d-4eeb-a5f8-3aca48bbe815" />Figure 2: A Python script is used to add data to Redis and retrieve the new data
A Python script is then used to create a new entry in the Redis database called openc3__settings_hacked with a key of store_url and a value of http://hacked.com.
Figure 3: The new data found in the Redis database
The new entry was successfully added to the Redis database, as is confirmed by using redis-cli.
The following example shows how an attacker might change the plugin store URL file that is stored in the config bucket.
Figure 4: Uploading file to change the plugin store URL setting
<img width="940" height="189" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/630db0bb-217e-4205-be1d-e9891516b22f" />Figure 5: The URL file was successfully changed
Steps To Reproduce
- Run the following Ruby code to find the Redis credentials:
puts `env | grep redis`
- Add the following Python script with the credentials to create a new entry and read it
import redis
import json
import time
r = redis.Redis(
host = 'openc3-redis',
port = 6379,
username = 'openc3',
password = 'openc3password',
decode_responses=True
)
# Save a setting
setting_data = {
'name': 'store_url',
'data': 'http://hacked.com',
'updated_at': time.time_ns()
}
r.hset('openc3__settings_hacked','store_url',json.dumps(setting_data))
print(r.hget('openc3__settings_hacked','store_url'))
Recommendations
• Limit the permissions of the script runner API to prevent lower level users from performing administrative actions
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | openc3 | all versions | 7.0.0-rc3bundle update openc3 --conservative |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openc3, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update openc3 to 7.0.0-rc3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr across RubyGems dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.