Hickory DNS through 0.25.0-alpha.3 DNSSEC Validation Bypass via RRSIG Signer's NameGHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c
GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c is a CWE-347 vulnerability. A fix is available — see the affected versions and patch details below.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Description
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.1 through 0.25.0-alpha.3 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because the validator verifies an RRSIG against the DNSKEY of whatever name appears in its Signer's Name field without checking that this name is the zone containing the RRset. Attackers controlling any secure zone can produce valid signatures over arbitrary records in unrelated zones, which resolvers, recursors, and clients using DnssecDnsHandle accept as authenticated.
Detection & mitigation playbook
VulnerabilityDetect
Identify every host running the affected component and compare the installed build against the fixed version below — for source-built or distro-packaged software the version string, not a lockfile, is the source of truth (`dpkg -l`, `rpm -q`, or the binary's own `--version`).
Fix
Upgrade the affected component to the fixed release for GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c, or apply your distribution's backported patch — distro builds are often patched at an older version number, so check your vendor's advisory rather than the upstream version alone.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2vgh-3wfw-qj7c in your dependencies?
Find it across your dependency tree, including transitive dependencies.