GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp
LOWGHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp is a low-severity (CVSS 3.8) CWE-459 vulnerability in better-auth. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Better Auth: Stale sessions persist after user deletion across admin, anonymous, and SCIM flows
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 368,634 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
better-authnpm@better-auth/scimnpmDescription
Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- They configure
secondaryStorageonbetterAuth(...)(Redis, KV, or any external session cache). session.storeSessionInDatabaseis left unset or set tofalse(the default).- Their application's deployment uses one or more of:
- The
adminplugin and callsauth.api.removeUser(...)orauthClient.admin.removeUser(...). - The
anonymousplugin and exposes/delete-anonymous-useror relies on the after-link hook to clean up the anonymous user. - The
@better-auth/scimplugin and exposesDELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId.
- The
If storeSessionInDatabase is true, sessions are also written to the database, and the database delete cascades; users are not affected.
Fix:
- Upgrade to
better-auth@<patched-version>or later (and@better-auth/scim@<patched-version>if they use SCIM). - If they cannot upgrade, see workarounds below.
Summary
When secondaryStorage is configured and storeSessionInDatabase is false, three user-deletion endpoints in better-auth plus one in @better-auth/scim call internalAdapter.deleteUser(userId) without first calling internalAdapter.deleteSessions(userId). The deleted user's session payload (which carries a cached user object) remains in secondary storage, and internalAdapter.findSession(token) keeps returning it as a valid session until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days).
Details
The vulnerable call sites are:
adminplugin'sremoveUser(packages/better-auth/src/plugins/admin/routes.ts:1463).anonymousplugin's self-delete endpoint (packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:222).anonymousplugin's after-link hook (packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:325).@better-auth/scim'sDELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId(packages/scim/src/routes.ts:1019).
Working callers that already do the right thing: the core /delete-user self-delete and /delete-user/callback (packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/update-user.ts:551).
The fix shape extends each vulnerable caller to invoke deleteSessions(userId) before deleteUser(userId). The architectural follow-up centralizes the cleanup inside deleteUser itself or introduces a single deleteUserAndSessions orchestrator so future callers cannot regress this contract.
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@<patched-version> and @better-auth/scim@<patched-version>. All four user-deletion call sites now invoke deleteSessions(userId) before deleteUser(userId) so sessions are evicted from secondary storage at the same time the user row is removed.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
- Configuration-level: set
session.storeSessionInDatabase: true. Subsequent user-delete writes reach the session table and the database cascade removes rows. Increases write volume for high-throughput sessions but eliminates the gap. - Code-level (admin path): when calling
auth.api.removeUser, also callauth.api.revokeUserSessions({ body: { userId } }), which usesdeleteSessionsinternally. - Code-level (SCIM path): wrap their SCIM provider's deprovisioning hook to call
auth.api.revokeUserSessions(...)after the SCIM DELETE. - Code-level (anonymous path): in
onLinkAccount, explicitly callinternalAdapter.deleteSessions(anonymousUser.user.id)before allowing the new session to be issued.
Impact
- Stale session validity: a deleted user's existing session cookie continues to authenticate against
getSessionFromCtxuntil the session TTL elapses (default 7 days). Within that window, the deleted user retains their pre-existing read and write surface. - SCIM-driven deprovisioning gap: organizations using SCIM to revoke offboarded employees' access do not, in fact, revoke active sessions. The deleted account remains usable for up to 7 days after deprovisioning.
Credit
Reported by @iruizsalinas.
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | better-auth | ≥ 0.3.4&&< 1.6.11 | 1.6.11 |
| 📦npm | @better-auth/scim | ≥ 1.6.0&&< 1.6.11 | 1.6.11 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for better-auth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update better-auth to 1.6.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.