GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch
GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch is a security vulnerability in joedolson/my-calendar. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Unauthenticated Information Disclosure (IDOR) via Multisite switch_to_blog in My Calendar
Real-World Exposure
joedolson/my-calendarReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the My Calendar plugin allows any unauthenticated user to extract calendar events (including private or hidden ones) from any sub-site on a WordPress Multisite network. On standard Single Site WordPress installations, this same endpoint crashes the PHP worker thread, creating an unauthenticated Denial of Service (DoS) vector.
Details
The vulnerability stems from the mc_ajax_mcjs_action AJAX function, which handles the mcjs_action endpoint. This endpoint is explicitly registered for unauthenticated users:
<?php
// In my-calendar-ajax.php
add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_mcjs_action', 'mc_ajax_mcjs_action' );
When the behavior parameter is set to loadupcoming, the plugin accepts an args parameter from the $_REQUEST array. Instead of validating specific expected arguments, the plugin unsafely passes the entire string into PHP's parse_str() function:
<?php
$request = isset( $_REQUEST['args'] ) ? wp_unslash( sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['args'] ) ) : array();
$request = str_replace( '|', '&', $request );
$request = parse_str( $request, $args );
// ...
$response = my_calendar_upcoming_events( $args );
This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary key-value pairs into the $args array. This array is then passed to the my_calendar_upcoming_events() function located in my-calendar-widgets.php.
At the beginning of this function, the plugin processes the attacker-controlled site argument:
<?php
// In my-calendar-widgets.php
if ( $args['site'] ) {
$args['site'] = ( 'global' === $args['site'] ) ? BLOG_ID_CURRENT_SITE : $args['site'];
switch_to_blog( $args['site'] );
}
The plugin blindly passes the attacker's supplied site ID into WordPress core's switch_to_blog() function without checking if the requesting user has the appropriate network-level privileges (e.g., Super Admin).
On Multisite configurations, the database context switches to the targeted sub-site, queries its events, and returns the HTML-rendered events array in the JSON response, leading to Information Disclosure across tenant boundaries. On Single Site configurations, the switch_to_blog() function does not exist in WordPress core. Calling it triggers an Uncaught PHP Error (Call to undefined function switch_to_blog()), resulting in a 500 Internal Server error ("Critical Error"). Repeated requests to this unauthenticated endpoint easily exhaust server resources.
PoC
1. Multisite Information Disclosure - IDOR
curl -s "http://<target-domain>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=mcjs_action&behavior=loadupcoming&args=site=2"
2. Single Site Denial of Service (DoS)
If the WordPress instance is not a Multisite, passing any truthy value to the site parameter will instantly crash the request thread:
curl -i -s "http://<target-domain>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=mcjs_action&behavior=loadupcoming&args=site=1"
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) / Information Exposure / Denial of Service (DoS) Who is impacted: All sites running the "My Calendar" plugin.
Anonymous internet users can silently map the network and extract private, unpublished, or intranet-specific events from unlaunched/internal sub-sites. Standard Single Site users are vulnerable to an easy-to-execute application-layer DoS, as it costs an attacker negligible resources to constantly crash PHP worker threads at an unauthenticated endpoint.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | joedolson/my-calendar | all versions | 3.7.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for joedolson/my-calendar. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update joedolson/my-calendar to 3.7.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2mvx-f5qm-v2ch across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.