GHSA-2h5h-59f5-c5x9
HIGHRekor's compressed archives can result in OOM conditions
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/sigstore/rekorReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Two vulnerabilities have been found in Rekor types for archive files JARs and APKs, where Rekor would crash due to out of memory conditions caused by reading archive metadata files into memory without checking their sizes first causing a Denial of Service of Rekor.
These vulnerabilities were found through fuzzing with OSS-Fuzz.
Vulnerability 1: OOM due to large files in META-INF directory of JAR files.
Summary
Verification of a JAR file submitted to Rekor can cause an out of memory crash if files within the META-INF directory of the JAR are sufficiently large.
Details
As part of verifying a JAR file, Rekor uses the relic library to check that the JAR is signed, the signature verifies, and that the hashes in the signed manifest are all valid. This library function reads files within META-INF/ into memory without checking their sizes, resulting in an OOM if the uncompressed file is sufficiently large. Rekor is also not performing any such checks prior to passing the JAR to this library function.
Patches
Users should update to the latest version of Rekor, 1.1.1.
Workaround
There are no workarounds, users should update.
Vulnerability 2: OOM due to large .SIGN and .PKGINFO files in APK files.
Summary
Parsing of an APK file submitted to Rekor can cause an out of memory crash if the .SIGN or .PKGINFO files within the APK are sufficiently large.
Details
When parsing an APK file, Rekor allocates byte slices to read both the .SIGN and .PKGINFO files into memory in order to verify the signature and hashes in the APK. These byte slices are allocated based on the size included in the tar header for each file, with no checks performed on that size. If the size in the header is sufficiently large, either because the uncompressed file is large or the size in the header has been artificially set to a large value, Rekor will crash due to an out of memory panic.
Patches
Users should update to the latest version of Rekor, 1.1.1.
Workaround
There are no workarounds, users should update.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/rekor | all versions | 1.1.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/rekor. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/sigstore/rekor to 1.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2h5h-59f5-c5x9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2h5h-59f5-c5x9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2h5h-59f5-c5x9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2h5h-59f5-c5x9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2h5h-59f5-c5x9 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.