How severe is GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227?

GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 affects the following packages: github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227?

Update github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers to 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227?

GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 8th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227?

GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is classified as Path Traversal (CWE-22), CWE-36 (CWE-36). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 was published on May 27, 2026 and was last updated on June 17, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227

Fix: kata-containers/kata-containers@ffa59ce

GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs

Also known asCVE-2026-47243GO-2026-5042

Published

May 27, 2026

Updated

Jun 17, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Aug 16, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs8th percentile — riskier than 8% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

In the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path, verified here with QEMU (and verified with Cloud Hypervisor too), Kata Containers runs host virtiofsd as root with:

--sandbox none --seccomp none

If an attacker has root-equivalent execution inside the Kata guest VM, they can send raw FUSE requests directly to the host virtiofsd. With the tested runtime-rs virtio-fs configuration, a raw FUSE_SYMLINK request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the virtio-fs shared directory.

This lets guest root create host-root owned symlinks in sensitive host paths. The PoC created here will create symlinks in the host /etc/cron.d directory, causing host cron to execute a guest-controlled payload as host root.

Impact: guest root can execute code as host root.

Affected configuration

The verified host used:

/opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml

rootless = false
shared_fs = "virtio-fs"
virtio_fs_daemon = "/opt/kata/libexec/virtiofsd"
hypervisor_name = "qemu"
debug_console_enabled = false

Pinned upstream references, using Kata Containers main commit 2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8:

runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs adds --sandbox none --seccomp none to the virtiofsd command line.
runtime-rs QEMU leaves rootless mode disabled by default: rootless = false.
The QEMU runtime-rs config template generates an installed config that uses standalone virtio-fs and points runtime-rs at the host virtiofsd binary: shared_fs and virtio_fs_daemon.
The runtime-rs Makefile resolves those placeholders to virtio-fs and $(LIBEXECDIR)/virtiofsd.
runtime-rs selects the same standalone virtio-fs implementation whenever shared_fs = "virtio-fs": ShareVirtioFsStandalone.

Details

The guest kernel normally owns the virtio-fs client. A normal guest process will use filesystem syscalls, and the guest kernel will validate the paths, and only then does the kernel send FUSE messages to the host backend.

An attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass that guest virtio-fs client. They can access the virtio-fs PCI device, mmap the virtio PCI BAR, recover guest physical addresses from /proc/self/pagemap, and build their own virtqueue from userspace. That queue can submit attacker-built FUSE messages directly to host virtiofsd.

The relevant primitive is FUSE_SYMLINK. An attacker can send a request whose body contains:

new symlink name: /etc/cron.d/kata-go-escape-cron-<pid>
symlink target: /proc/<pid>/root/run/kata-containers/shared/sandboxes/<sid>/ro/passthrough/<sid>/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload

The new symlink name is an absolute host path. virtiofsd should reject that request or force it to resolve below the configured --shared-dir. In the tested runtime-rs path, host-root unsandboxed virtiofsd accepts the absolute name, creating a real host symlink under /etc/cron.d.

The attacker can make the symlink target resolve through /proc/<pid>/root/... for a live Kata runtime process whose mount namespace can see the guest-created payload. One matching runtime PID is enough.

When the host cron reads /etc/cron.d, it follows the root-owned symlink, loads the guest-created crontab payload, and executes it as host root.

PoC

sudo timeout --foreground --kill-after=10s 600s ctr run --rm \
  --runtime /opt/kata/runtime-rs/bin/containerd-shim-kata-v2 \
  --runtime-config-path /opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml \
  --privileged \
  --privileged-without-host-devices \
  docker.io/library/kata-go-escape:local \
  "$run_id"

The container is privileged only to model the post-escape condition where the attacker already has guest-root capabilities. It is not the vulnerability by itself.

Inside the guest, the PoC:

Writes a cron payload to guest /tmp/kata-go-escape-payload.
Finds the virtio-fs PCI device in guest /sys.
Takes over a virtio-fs queue from userspace.
Sends FUSE_INIT.
Discovers the current runtime-rs sandbox under passthrough/.
Looks up passthrough/<sid>/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload.
Sends raw FUSE_SYMLINK requests where the new symlink names are absolute host paths under /etc/cron.d.
Keeps the guest alive while host cron scans.

Example log lines:

[guest] virtio-fs PCI device: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:05.0
[res] sandbox_id=kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539
[res] lookup_path_error=0 path=passthrough/kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload nodeid=21
[spray] pid=1 err=-2 created_candidates=1

err=-2 is expected for the symlink spray. virtiofsd can return ENOENT after the side effect because its follow-up lookup is still relative to the export root. The host symlink creation has already happened.

Impact

The PoC proves guest-root to host-root command execution.

Verified host proof:

/run/kata-go-escape.proof

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Mon May 11 18:05:01 UTC 2026

The proof file is written in host /run by host cron. It is not written by the guest process and not written by virtiofsd.

An attacker who reaches guest root can therefore cross the Kata isolation boundary and execute commands as host root on affected runtime-rs virtio-fs deployments.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers`	all versions	0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers to 0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path, verified here with QEMU (and verified with Cloud Hypervisor too), Kata Containers runs host `virtiofsd` as root with: ``` --sandbox none --seccomp none ``` If an attacker has root-equivalent execution inside the Kata guest VM, they can send raw FUSE requests directly to the host `virtiofsd`. With the tested runtime-rs virtio-fs configuration, a raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the virtio-fs shared directory. This lets guest root create host-root owned symlinks in sensitive

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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