What is GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759?

### Summary `commands.allowFrom` is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include `ctx.From` (conversation identity) as a sender candidate. When `commands.allowFrom` contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord `channel: ` or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.22-2` - Patched version: `2026.2.23` (re

How severe is GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759?

GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 affects the following packages: openclaw (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759?

Update openclaw to 2026.2.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 was published on March 3, 2026 and was last updated on March 4, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759

OpenClaw's commands.allowFrom sender authorization accepted conversation identifiers via ctx.From

Published

Mar 3, 2026

Updated

Mar 4, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm

4.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

commands.allowFrom is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include ctx.From (conversation identity) as a sender candidate.

When commands.allowFrom contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord channel:<id> or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= 2026.2.22-2
Patched version: 2026.2.23 (released)

Details

Root cause: resolveSenderCandidates() in src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts always included ctx.From in candidate evaluation used by commands.allowFrom authorization checks.

ctx.From is sender-like in some direct-message contexts, but conversation-like in channel/group/thread contexts. This mixed principal handling allowed conversation identifiers to satisfy sender-only authorization.

Impact

In affected versions, command/directive authorization could become broader than intended when operators configured commands.allowFrom with conversation identifiers, allowing unintended users in that conversation to run command-only/directive-only flows.

Fix

Main branch now treats commands.allowFrom as sender-only:

ctx.From is no longer included as a general sender candidate.
ctx.From is only used as fallback when sender fields are absent and the value is not conversation-shaped.
Regression tests were added for conversation-id denial and direct-message fallback preservation.

Fix Commit(s)

08e2aa44e78a9c946d97bea62304e6f533b8fa8e

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the released version (2026.2.23). This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.

OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`openclaw`	all versions	2026.2.23

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.2.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `commands.allowFrom` is documented as a sender authorization allowlist for commands/directives, but command authorization could include `ctx.From` (conversation identity) as a sender candidate. When `commands.allowFrom` contained conversation-like identifiers (for example Discord `channel:<id>` or WhatsApp group JIDs), command/directive authorization could be granted to participants in that conversation instead of only the intended sender identity. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.22-2` - Patched version: `2026.2.23` (re

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-2ch6-x3g4-7759 in your dependencies?

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