GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97
Fix: apache/camel@23a833eGHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97 is a CWE-178 vulnerability in org.apache.camel:camel-support. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering
Real-World Exposure
org.apache.camel:camel-support☕org.apache.camel:camel-support☕org.apache.camel:camel-supportReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Bypass/Injection vulnerability in Apache Camel components under particular conditions.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.9.0 through <= 4.10.1, from 4.8.0 through <= 4.8.4, from 3.10.0 through <= 3.22.3.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.10.2 for 4.10.x LTS, 4.8.5 for 4.8.x LTS and 3.22.4 for 3.x releases.
This vulnerability is present in Camel's default incoming header filter, that allows an attacker to include Camel specific headers that for some Camel components can alter the behaviours such as the camel-bean component, to call another method on the bean, than was coded in the application. In the camel-jms component, then a malicious header can be used to send the message to another queue (on the same broker) than was coded in the application. This could also be seen by using the camel-exec component.
The attacker would need to inject custom headers, such as HTTP protocols. So if you have Camel applications that are directly connected to the internet via HTTP, then an attacker could include malicious HTTP headers in the HTTP requests that are send to the Camel application.
All the known Camel HTTP component such as camel-servlet, camel-jetty, camel-undertow, camel-platform-http, and camel-netty-http would be vulnerable out of the box.
In these conditions an attacker could be able to forge a Camel header name and make the bean component invoking other methods in the same bean.
In terms of usage of the default header filter strategy the list of components using that is:
- camel-activemq
- camel-activemq6
- camel-amqp
- camel-aws2-sqs
- camel-azure-servicebus
- camel-cxf-rest
- camel-cxf-soap
- camel-http
- camel-jetty
- camel-jms
- camel-kafka
- camel-knative
- camel-mail
- camel-nats
- camel-netty-http
- camel-platform-http
- camel-rest
- camel-sjms
- camel-spring-rabbitmq
- camel-stomp
- camel-tahu
- camel-undertow
- camel-xmpp
The vulnerability arises due to a bug in the default filtering mechanism that only blocks headers starting with "Camel", "camel", or "org.apache.camel.".
Mitigation: You can easily work around this in your Camel applications by removing the headers in your Camel routes. There are many ways of doing this, also globally or per route. This means you could use the removeHeaders EIP, to filter out anything like "cAmel, cAMEL" etc, or in general everything not starting with "Camel", "camel" or "org.apache.camel.".
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-support | ≥ 3.10.0&&< 3.22.4 | 3.22.4 |
| ☕Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-support | ≥ 4.0.0-M1&&< 4.8.5 | 4.8.5 |
| ☕Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-support | ≥ 4.9.0&&< 4.10.2 | 4.10.2 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.apache.camel:camel-support. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.apache.camel:camel-support to 3.22.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-2c2h-2855-mf97 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.