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📦 npm

GHSA-26f5-8h2x-34xh

MEDIUM

h3 has an observable timing discrepancy in basic auth utils

Also known asCVE-2026-33129
Published
Mar 18, 2026
Updated
Mar 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk23th percentile+0.26%
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.3%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

h3npm
36.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A Timing Side-Channel vulnerability exists in the requireBasicAuth function due to the use of unsafe string comparison (!==). This allows an attacker to deduce the valid password character-by-character by measuring the server's response time, effectively bypassing password complexity protections.

Details

The vulnerability is located in the requireBasicAuth function. The code performs a standard string comparison between the user-provided password and the expected password:

if (opts.password && password !== opts.password) {
  throw autheFailed(event, opts?.realm);
}

In V8 (and most runtime environments), the !== operator is optimized to "fail fast." It stops execution and returns false as soon as it encounters the first mismatched byte.

  • If the first character is wrong, it returns immediately.
  • If the first character is correct but the second is wrong, it takes slightly longer.

By statistically analyzing these minute timing differences over many requests, an attacker can determine the correct password one character at a time.

PoC

This vulnerability is exploitable in real-world scenarios without direct access to the server machine.

To reproduce this, an attacker can send two packets (or bursts of packets) at the exact same time:

  1. Packet A: Contains a password that is known to be incorrect starting at the first character (e.g., AAAA...).
  2. Packet B: Contains a password where the first character is a guess (e.g., B...).

By measuring the time-to-first-byte (TTFB) or total response time of these concurrent requests, the attacker can filter out network jitter. If Packet B takes consistently longer to return than Packet A, the first character is confirmed as correct. This process is repeated for the second character, and so on. Tests confirm this timing difference is statistically consistent enough to recover credentials remotely.

Impact

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to recover passwords. While network jitter makes this difficult over the internet, it is highly effective in local networks or cloud environments where the attacker is co-located. It reduces the complexity of cracking a password from exponential (guessing the whole string) to linear (guessing one char at a time).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmh32.0.0-beta.0&&< 2.0.1-rc.92.0.1-rc.9

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for h3. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update h3 to 2.0.1-rc.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-26f5-8h2x-34xh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-26f5-8h2x-34xh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-26f5-8h2x-34xh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A Timing Side-Channel vulnerability exists in the `requireBasicAuth` function due to the use of unsafe string comparison (`!==`). This allows an attacker to deduce the valid password character-by-character by measuring the server's response time, effectively bypassing password complexity protections. ### Details The vulnerability is located in the `requireBasicAuth` function. The code performs a standard string comparison between the user-provided password and the expected password: ~~~typescript if (opts.password && password !== opts.password) { throw autheFailed(event, opts?.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-26f5-8h2x-34xh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-26f5-8h2x-34xh across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.