GHSA-22p9-r2f5-22mf — onionshare-cli

Summary

OnionShare CLI/Desktop 2.6.3 can follow symbolic links inside a selected Share or Website directory and serve the symlink target rather than limiting access to files physically contained in the selected directory. If a user shares a directory that contains attacker-supplied or otherwise untrusted symlinks, a remote recipient with access to the OnionShare service can read arbitrary local files readable by the OnionShare process that the symlink points to.

This affects the shipped onionshare-cli Python package and the desktop application because both call the same onionshare_cli.web file-indexing and streaming code.

Details

Tested repository: https://github.com/onionshare/onionshare at commit 8cc75e1d7e88bd31f7276733449d412bf71c8999.

Affected product evidence:

• cli/pyproject.toml declares onionshare_cli version 2.6.3.
• desktop/pyproject.toml declares onionshare version 2.6.3 and depends on onionshare_cli from ../cli.
• cli/setup.py publishes onionshare-cli and includes onionshare_cli.web plus templates/static resources.
• desktop/setup.py publishes onionshare and exposes both onionshare and onionshare-cli console scripts.

Reachable default/common paths:

• CLI share mode is the default mode when no --receive, --website, or --chat flag is provided (cli/onionshare_cli/__init__.py:234-241) and accepts filesystem paths from CLI arguments (cli/onionshare_cli/__init__.py:184-189).
• CLI website mode is exposed through --website (cli/onionshare_cli/__init__.py:55-59).
• Desktop Website mode calls self.web.website_mode.set_file_info(self.filenames) before starting (desktop/onionshare/tab/mode/website_mode/__init__.py:281-287). Desktop Share mode calls self.mode.web.share_mode.set_file_info(...) before serving (desktop/onionshare/tab/mode/share_mode/threads.py:42-49).
• Documentation describes Website mode as selecting files/folders and serving them over OnionShare (docs/source/features.rst:109-115).

Root cause:

• SendBaseModeWeb.set_file_info() expands a single selected directory into immediate children and records os.path.isfile() entries without rejecting symlinks (cli/onionshare_cli/web/send_base_mode.py:73-80, cli/onionshare_cli/web/send_base_mode.py:100-130). On POSIX, os.path.isfile() follows a symlink to a regular file.
• Website mode serves any mapped file path through stream_individual_file() (cli/onionshare_cli/web/website_mode.py:71-97). stream_individual_file() opens the mapped filesystem path directly (cli/onionshare_cli/web/send_base_mode.py:199-313, especially open(file_to_download, "rb") at line 237).
• Share mode default /download can include a symlink target when a single selected folder is expanded into root entries and ZipWriter.add_file() calls self.z.write(filename, ...) without rejecting symlinks (cli/onionshare_cli/web/share_mode.py:473-539, cli/onionshare_cli/web/share_mode.py:574-580).
• Share mode with --no-autostop-sharing enables individual file downloads (cli/onionshare_cli/web/share_mode.py:122-125) and reaches the same direct streaming sink (cli/onionshare_cli/web/share_mode.py:430-447).
• A partial mitigation exists only for recursive ZIP directory traversal: ZipWriter.add_dir() skips os.path.islink(full_filename) (cli/onionshare_cli/web/share_mode.py:582-600). That mitigation does not cover Website mode, Share individual downloads, or Share ZIP generation for root-level symlinks after the single-folder expansion path.

False-positive screening performed:

• URL path traversal without a mapped entry returned 404; the issue is not raw ../ traversal but symlink following after a selected directory has been indexed.
• Jinja/template escaping and CSP do not mitigate this because the sink is file read/streaming.
• Share mode has a symlink skip in recursive ZIP addition, but local PoC confirmed sibling paths still dereference symlinks.
• The default non-public onion service requires the recipient to know the onion address and private key unless the user opts into public mode; this limits exposure but does not prevent disclosure to an authorized recipient or to anyone with the URL/key.

Affected versions / patched versions:

• Affected versions: unknown; confirmed in version 2.6.3 at commit 8cc75e1d7e88bd31f7276733449d412bf71c8999. Earlier versions were not tested during this audit.
• Patched versions: 2.6.4

Severity:

• Rationale: AV:N because the file is exposed over the OnionShare HTTP service; AC:H because exploitation requires the victim to share a directory containing an attacker-influenced or untrusted symlink to a sensitive local file; PR:L because the attacker generally needs the OnionShare URL/private key unless the user intentionally runs public mode; UI:R because the OnionShare user must select/start sharing the affected directory; S:U because the same local process reads and serves the file; C:H because the symlink can point at high-value readable local secrets; I:N/A:N because the confirmed impact is unintended read/disclosure.

PoC

The following safe local proof uses only temporary files and Flask's local test client. In this audit environment, several runtime dependencies were absent (waitress, flask_compress, flask_socketio, unidecode, stem, qrcode), so the harness stubbed those imports while executing the real send_base_mode, website_mode, and share_mode vulnerable code paths. No external network traffic was sent and no real secrets were read.

Maintainer reproduction from a clean checkout with normal dependencies can omit the import stubs and run the same object/test-client setup, or can start OnionShare locally with a temporary directory containing the symlink.

Positive setup and trigger:

import os, tempfile, shutil
from onionshare_cli.common import Common
from onionshare_cli.settings import Settings
from onionshare_cli.mode_settings import ModeSettings
from onionshare_cli.web import Web

base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix='os-symlink-final-poc-')
outside = os.path.join(base, 'outside-secret.txt')
root = os.path.join(base, 'site')
os.mkdir(root)
open(outside, 'w').write('OUTSIDE_SECRET_MARKER')
os.symlink(outside, os.path.join(root, 'link.txt'))

common = Common()
common.settings = Settings(common)

w = Web(common, False, ModeSettings(common), 'website')
w.app.testing = True
w.website_mode.set_file_info([root])
with w.app.test_client() as c:
    print(c.get('/link.txt').status_code)
    print(c.get('/link.txt').get_data(as_text=True))

s = Web(common, False, ModeSettings(common), 'share')
s.app.testing = True
s.share_mode.set_file_info([root])
with s.app.test_client() as c:
    print('OUTSIDE_SECRET_MARKER' in c.get('/download').get_data(as_text=True))

s2 = Web(common, False, ModeSettings(common), 'share')
s2.app.testing = True
s2.settings.set('share', 'autostop_sharing', False)
s2.share_mode.set_file_info([root])
with s2.app.test_client() as c:
    print(c.get('/link.txt').status_code)
    print(c.get('/link.txt').get_data(as_text=True))

shutil.rmtree(base)

Observed output from this environment after re-running the proof after drafting:

website_mapped_link_is_symlink: True
website_positive_status: 200
website_positive_body: OUTSIDE_SECRET_MARKER
website_control_status: 404
website_control_contains_secret: False
share_zip_status: 200
share_zip_contains_secret: True
share_individual_status: 200
share_individual_body: OUTSIDE_SECRET_MARKER
cleanup_done: true

Negative/control case:

• Requesting /missing.txt in Website mode returned HTTP 404 and did not contain OUTSIDE_SECRET_MARKER, showing the proof is not a general path traversal or test harness artifact.
• Recursive ZIP traversal has a partial control mitigation in ZipWriter.add_dir() (cli/onionshare_cli/web/share_mode.py:593-596), but the proven variants bypass that sibling mitigation through root-level single-folder expansion and direct file streaming.

Cleanup:

• The PoC deletes the temporary directory with shutil.rmtree(base); the audit run printed cleanup_done: true.

Impact

A remote recipient of an OnionShare Share or Website service can obtain files outside the selected shared directory if that directory contains a symlink to a readable local file. This can disclose SSH keys, browser profile data, wallet files, documents, or other local secrets readable by the OnionShare process.

The most realistic attack is a malicious archive/project/export supplied to the OnionShare user that contains a symlink to a sensitive path. If the user extracts or otherwise obtains that directory and shares it with OnionShare, the recipient can request the symlink path through Website mode, Share individual-file mode, or receive it inside the default Share ZIP in the single-folder root-symlink case.

The issue is especially surprising because one ZIP code path already tries to skip symlinks recursively, which suggests symlink dereference outside the shared tree is not intended.

Suggested remediation

Reject symlinks and enforce canonical containment both when building the file map and immediately before opening/streaming/zipping a file:

• In SendBaseModeWeb.set_file_info(), do not add paths where os.path.islink(path) is true.
• Track selected root directories as canonical Path.resolve() values and require every served/zipped file's resolved path to remain under one of those roots.
• Re-check the resolved path immediately before open() in stream_individual_file() and before ZipWriter.add_file() / ZipWriter.add_dir() to avoid symlink-swap/TOCTOU surprises.
• Add regression tests for:
  • Website mode serving a root-level symlink.
  • Website mode serving a nested symlink.
  • Share default /download ZIP for a single selected folder containing a symlink.
  • Share --no-autostop-sharing individual-file symlink download.
  • Existing recursive ZIP symlink skip behavior.