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CVE-2026-95842 — moquette-broker

Fix: moquette-io/moquette@86feb7c

CVE-2026-95842 is a CWE-248 vulnerability in io.moquette:moquette-broker. A fix is available for io.moquette:moquette-broker — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Moquette uncaught MQTT command exceptions can terminate shared session event loops

Published
Sep 23, 2026
Updated
Sep 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 25, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-95842.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
☕io.moquette:moquette-broker

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, not RCE (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit da7f719a6bab9829d520b5838e13ea7b1f9be3ef, module broker/.

What a connecting client can do

  1. (Critical) Bypass pattern-based ACLs across tenants. In AuthorizationsCollector.canDoOperation (AuthorizationsCollector.java:116-131, esp. line 123) the clientId/username is substituted raw into a pattern ACL rule and then wildcard-matched, and the clientId is never validated for MQTT wildcard characters +/# at CONNECT (MQTTConnection.processConnect):

Topic substitutedTopic = new Topic(auth.topic.toString().replace("%c", client).replace("%u", username)); if (topic.match(substitutedTopic)) return true;

A client that connects with clientId + turns sensor/%c/# into the filter sensor/+/#, gaining cross-tenant read AND write. (Precondition: pattern ACL rules configured — a common multi-tenant setup.)

  1. (High) Crash the whole broker. SessionEventLoop (SessionEventLoop.java:40-54) catches only InterruptedException and is never restarted (SessionEventLoopGroup), so any uncaught exception on it wedges every co-located client. Trivially reachable inputs: malformed $share/grp SUBSCRIBE (SharedSubscriptionUtils.extractShareName -> StringIndexOutOfBoundsException), deeply nested topic (CTrie recursion -> StackOverflowError), and ACL NPE below. Unbounded subscriptions / retained / in-flight / topic-alias / interceptor state (BrokerInterceptor uses an unbounded queue) also allow OOM; durable stores allow disk exhaustion.

  2. (High) NPE in ACL sink on clientId # (invalid filter sensor/#/# -> null tokens -> Topic.match NPE at Topic.java:173).

  3. (High) Will-message authorization bypass. Last-Will topic is published (PostOffice.publishWill) without canWrite/reserved-topic checks used for normal PUBLISH.

  4. (Medium) Cross-session durable corruption. H2PersistentQueue opens queue_"+clientId and queue_"+clientId+"_meta; client id sensor_meta collides with victim sensor metadata map -> corrupts head/tail.

  5. (Medium) Fail-open if authenticator/authorizator class fails to load -> PermitAll/AcceptAll (Server.java:483-531).

Proof of concept

Source-only, no network; PoCs run on JDK 17:

  • PoCPatternAcl — clientId + gains cross-tenant read/write; clientId # triggers NPE
  • PoCSharedSubCrash — extractShareName("$share/grp") throws StringIndexOutOfBoundsException
  • PoCMapCollision — H2 MVStore collision overwrites victim metadata pointer

Impact

Cross-tenant eavesdropping and injection, whole-broker DoS, unauthorized Will publishes, and cross-session durable corruption.

Remediation

  1. Reject clientId/username containing +/# (and / if structural) at CONNECT; expand %c/%u as literal tokens.
  2. Harden SessionEventLoop (catch Throwable + restart supervision) and validate $share filters.
  3. Apply authorization to Will publishes like normal PUBLISH.
  4. Add resource caps (connections, queues, retained, aliases, interceptor queue) + bounded session expiry.
  5. Separate H2 namespaces and fail closed on auth-class load failure.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.moquette:moquette-brokerall versions0.18.1io.moquette:moquette-broker:0.18.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.moquette:moquette-broker, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.moquette:moquette-broker to 0.18.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-95842 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-95842 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-95842. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

moquette is reachable by untrusted MQTT clients (anonymous by default), so every byte from any client, including pre-authentication, is untrusted. This is a memory-safe JVM: the ceiling is authorization/ACL bypass + denial of service + cross-session integrity, **not RCE** (I did not find one and do not claim one). Audited at commit `da7f719a6bab9829d520b5838e13ea7b1f9be3ef`, module `broker/`. ## What a connecting client can do 1. (Critical) Bypass `pattern`-based ACLs across tenants. In `AuthorizationsCollector.canDoOperation` (AuthorizationsCollector.java:116-131, esp. line 123) the clientI
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-95842 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-95842 across Maven dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-95842: moquette-broker RCE | O3 Security