CVE-2026-84360 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-288 vulnerability in github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI. A fix is available for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-84360.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-84360 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,415 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UIReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An OTP-enabled authenticated user who cannot use the HTTP configuration mutation endpoints without a valid secure session can still mutate Nginx configuration through /mcp and /mcp_message using only ordinary authentication.
Details
The HTTP configuration mutation surface is explicitly grouped behind middleware.RequireSecureSession(). By contrast, the MCP endpoints are exposed with only middleware.AuthRequired(). The MCP server exposes configuration mutation tools including nginx_config_add and nginx_config_modify, so OTP-enabled users gain an alternate path around the intended step-up requirement.
Relevant code paths:
- api/config/router.go
- internal/middleware/secure_session.go
- mcp/router.go
- mcp/config/config_add.go
- mcp/config/config_modify.go
This is a security-control bypass rather than a missing feature. The product already established that OTP-enabled users should complete a secure session before high-impact configuration mutations are accepted on the HTTP path.
PoC
I verified this locally in an isolated environment with a temporary end-to-end harness that exercised the real /mcp and /mcp_message routes.
What the executed test did:
- Created a temporary config directory and configured Nginx control commands to harmless local values (
true) to avoid touching the host. - Created a real OTP-enabled user in a temporary SQLite database.
- Generated a real JWT for that OTP-enabled user.
- Started a local test server exposing the real
/mcpand/mcp_messageroutes. - Opened an authenticated SSE connection to
/mcpwith the JWT and noX-Secure-Session-ID. - Initialized the MCP session over
/mcp_message. - Called the real
nginx_config_addtool over/mcp_message. - Verified that the tool succeeded and created
mcp-bypass.confin the managed config directory without any secure-session step-up.
Observed result from the actual local verification:
- The MCP session initialized successfully without any
X-Secure-Session-ID. - The config file was written through the MCP tool path using only JWT authentication.
Impact
OTP-enabled accounts lose the intended step-up protection for high-impact Nginx configuration changes when MCP is enabled. A user who should be blocked until re-authenticating can still create or modify configuration files and trigger reload behavior through MCP.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI | all versions | 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0go get github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI@v1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-84360 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-84360 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.