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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-82404 — @toon-format/toon

HIGHFix: toon-format/toon@94a2b75

CVE-2026-82404 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) CWE-1321 vulnerability in @toon-format/toon. A fix is available for @toon-format/toon — see the affected versions and patch details below.

TOON: Prototype pollution when decoding untrusted TOON input

Also known asGHSA-p95v-992w-h6c3
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs51th percentile — riskier than 51% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.18%0.51%0.84%1.18%0.7%0.7%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-82404 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 390,807 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

654other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@toon-format/toonnpm
1.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key wrote through the object's prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting Object.prototype for the whole runtime. The expandPaths: 'safe' path (dotted keys such as a.__proto__.x) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own __proto__ properties and could fire an inherited setter while normalizing.

Impact

Any service that decodes untrusted TOON is affected. Prototype pollution can escalate to denial of service or, with a suitable downstream gadget, remote code execution.

Patches

Upgrade to @toon-format/[email protected]. Decoders now materialize __proto__/constructor/prototype as ordinary own data properties, matching JSON.parse semantics; the encoder preserves the same keys without invoking inherited accessors.

Workarounds

None. Upgrade is the only fix. Callers who cannot upgrade should reject input whose keys include __proto__, constructor, or prototype before decoding.

Port maintainers

The same bug shape can exist in any implementation that assigns decoded keys with obj[key] = value. Rust, Swift, Java, Python, and C# ports should audit their object-construction and path-expansion paths for the three prototype keys.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@toon-format/toonall versions2.3.1npm install @toon-format/toon@2.3.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @toon-format/toon, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @toon-format/toon to 2.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-82404 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Decoding attacker-controlled TOON containing a `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` key wrote through the object's prototype chain instead of creating an own property, polluting `Object.prototype` for the whole runtime. The `expandPaths: 'safe'` path (dotted keys such as `a.__proto__.x`) was the strongest vector; plain nested objects, tabular rows, and quoted keys were all affected. The encoder had a matching defect: it silently dropped own `__proto__` properties and could fire an inherited setter while normalizing. ### Impact Any service that decodes untrusted TOON is aff
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-82404: @toon-format/toon RCE — Fixed in 2.3.1