CVE-2026-80712
CVE-2026-80712 is a security vulnerability. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-80712 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD…
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE
qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits the descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command immediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only placed into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a second submission - so the chip is programmed with whatever that register happened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only applied by the next SET_FEATURE.
Measured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing 0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the subsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 - every write lands one operation late.
This stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together with OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode, reads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during MTD registration. With the off-by-one, the "disable" write actually applies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set: the chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP area instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes fail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board that makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable.
Write the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same transaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the operation actually carries - the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte pointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand->scratchbuf).
With this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a known-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware (md5-verified across partitions), and writes work.
Detection & mitigation playbook
VulnerabilityDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for the affected component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of the affected component has shipped for CVE-2026-80712 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-80712 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-80712. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-80712 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-80712 across dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.