CVE-2026-80674
CVE-2026-80674 is a security vulnerability. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-80674 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator A base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked…
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator
A base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list() only on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a resident attribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation at all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list -- ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and ntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads attr_list_entry fixed-header fields (lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with bounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident attribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive out-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.
load_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7), ale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an "al < al_start + size" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the fixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.
Factor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(), which requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct attr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced, that ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the name, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference. ntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries tile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list() (replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the resident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped validation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other two attribute-list walks.
Detection & mitigation playbook
VulnerabilityDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for the affected component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of the affected component has shipped for CVE-2026-80674 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-80674 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-80674. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-80674 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-80674 across dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.