CVE-2026-80527
HIGHCVE-2026-80527 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Kernel. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-80527 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-80527 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 365,433 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
KernelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Linux packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted
A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds FILE_RD, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via mds_wanted).
One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke FILE_RD
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire FILE_RD. If
the cap update that should request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after cap->mds_wanted was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local mds_wanted still includes the file read
caps.
In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees need <= mds_wanted and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on i_cap_wq. If the cap
update that was supposed to request FILE_RD never reaches the MDS after cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.
The ordering issue is that cap->mds_wanted is updated in
__prep_cap() before the CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message is actually
queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.
A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
However, simply moving the cap->mds_wanted assignment later would
not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not
guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and
reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption.
Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state
machine.
To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a simpler workaround:
-
stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait, fall back to the renew path
-
make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous
OPENrequest whenever the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of only calling ceph_check_caps()
The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary
because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any
real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can
still hold something like pLs and yet be missing FILE_RD
completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not
sufficient, because it still trusts cap->mds_wanted and may resend
nothing. By requiring (issued & wanted) == wanted before taking the
asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the
wanted caps are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the
synchronous OPEN renew.
This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted
caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and
fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually
retries through a path that does not rely on the stale mds_wanted
state.
[ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to mds_client.h, formatting ]
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐧Linux | Kernel | ≥ 5.8.0&&< 5.10.266 | 5.10.266 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Kernel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update Kernel to 5.10.266 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-80527 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-80527 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-80527. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-80527 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-80527 across Linux dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.