CVE-2026-76221 — gitpython

Summary

GitPython's config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the "option" label; it does not reject =, #, ;, [, ], or whitespace in an option name. write_section writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as sshCommand = touch <cmd> # is written as \tsshCommand = touch <cmd> # = <value>, which git parses as core.sshCommand = touch <cmd> (the trailing # comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand, core.hooksPath, alias.*) → RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not section name) and distinct character class (=/#/space, not newline/bracket) from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).

Root Cause

_assure_config_name_safe(name, label) (git/config.py:897) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY when label == "section"; for the "option" label it falls through with just the UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\r\n\x00] regex. write_section then writes the option name verbatim into "\t%s = %s\n" (config.py:702).

Impact

Arbitrary git-config directive injection → remote code execution via core.sshCommand (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed) or core.hooksPath (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.

Proof of Concept

with repo.config_writer() as cw:
    cw.set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x")
# git config --get core.sshCommand  ->  touch /tmp/RCE

Attack Chain

1. Entry: app calls config writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x").
2. Check: _assure_config_name_safe(option, "option") @ config.py. Guard: regex matches only [\r\n\x00]; bracket/quote state machine is gated on label=="section". Bypass proof: =,#,space pass → no ValueError.
3. Sink: write_section writes "\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\n" (config.py:702).
4. Impact: git parses core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE → arbitrary code execution on next git op.

Bypass Evidence

Independently reproduced (gate harness): set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x') → no ValueError; file line sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x; git config --get core.sshCommand → touch <RCE> (rc=0). Also verified core.hooksPath via both GitConfigParser and repo.config_writer(). Fix-commit read: bracket/quote checks are inside if label == "section"; the "option" label is not covered.

Affected Versions

GitPython <= 3.1.57 (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).

Suggested Fix

Apply the section-name safety checks (reject =, #, ;, [, ], whitespace) to the "option" label as well, or validate the fully-rendered config line after substitution.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use