Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-73423

Fix: withastro/astro#17250

CVE-2026-73423 is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in astro. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-73423 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered

Published
Jul 20, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 12, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

661other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
astronpm
4.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the security.checkOrigin protection is only installed by the middleware() primitive. The actions() and pages() primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) middleware() will bypass the origin check for those requests.

Details

security.checkOrigin (default: true) is intended to reject cross-site POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE form submissions. In the classic pipeline (astro() all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no src/middleware.ts. In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside middleware() — so:

  • Mounting actions() before middleware() allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. The examples/advanced-routing example and the Cloudflare hono docs shipped this order.
  • Omitting middleware() entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently drops checkOrigin protection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched through pages().

The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim's cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.

Affected versions

Astro >= 7.0.0 when using the composable astro/hono pipeline with either:

  • actions() mounted before middleware(), or
  • pages() used without middleware()

The default (non-composable) pipeline is not affected.

Fix

The origin check is now applied at each dispatch sink (ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback), gated on manifest.checkOrigin, using the same predicate as the middleware. The check is order-independent and a no-op when middleware() has already run.

Fix: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17250

Workaround

Ensure middleware() is mounted before both actions() and pages() in the composable pipeline, and that it is always included even when no custom middleware logic is needed:

app.use(middleware());
app.use(actions());
app.use(pages());

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmastro7.0.0&&< 7.0.67.0.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for astro. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update astro to 7.0.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73423 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-73423 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-73423. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary In the composable `astro/hono` pipeline, the `security.checkOrigin` protection is only installed by the `middleware()` primitive. The `actions()` and `pages()` primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) `middleware()` will bypass the origin check for those requests. ## Details `security.checkOrigin` (default: `true`) is intended to reject cross-site `POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` form submissions. In the classic pipeline (`astro()` all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-73423 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-73423 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.