CVE-2026-72796 — kernel

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72796.

Summary

Several static-file routes in the server mux (kernel/server/serve.go) are registered with CheckAuth only and serve directories directly, without the publish-access checks, sensitive-path blocklist, or refuseToAccess rules that the REST API applies to the same data. They are therefore reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.

Most notably, /templates/ serves data/templates a directory the REST file API explicitly refuses to serve to non-administrators.

Details

/templates/ directly contradicts an existing control. The REST file path runs refuseToAccess (kernel/api/file.go:551-553), which explicitly returns 403 for data/templates/ to non-administrators the project has already decided readers must not read templates. The /templates/ static route serves that same directory to any RoleReader, with no IsSensitivePath check, no publish-access check, and no refuseToAccess. Templates are user-authored Markdown documents containing template/Sprig syntax and are not covered by publish-access controls. gin's .Static disables directory listing, so a filename is required but the contradiction with refuseToAccess is the defect.

/export/ versus /assets/. /assets/*path (line 692) correctly gates non-administrators via CheckAbsPathAccessableByPublishAccess, plus IsSensitivePath and encrypted-asset handling. /export/ carries traversal, sensitive-path and DEK guards but no publish-access check, so a reader can retrieve export artifacts of arbitrary documents, including private ones. Artifact naming is mixed, some use a random export ID, but code and CSV exports use the document name (export/code/<name>, export/csv/<name>/<name>.csv), which a reader can derive from listDocsByPath titles while the artifact exists. This path is therefore conditional.

Confirmed correctly gated, for contrast: /assets/* (publish-gated), /history/* and /repo/diff/* (CheckAdminRole), /debug/pprof/* (disabled in production builds), /public/ (intentionally public).

All four routes above were verified to carry CheckAuth only, no CheckReadonly, no CheckAdminRole.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account.

Templates: served despite the REST API refusing them:

GET http://127.0.0.1:6808/templates/<template-file>.md
→ 200, template content

The equivalent REST request is refused:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/file/getFile
{"path":"data/templates/<template-file>.md"}
→ 403 (refuseToAccess)

The same reader session obtains the file through the static route.

Snippets:

GET http://127.0.0.1:6808/snippets/<snippet-name>.js
→ 200, snippet source

Export artifacts (conditional on a predictable name while the artifact exists):

GET http://127.0.0.1:6808/export/csv/<doc-name>/<doc-name>.csv
→ 200, exported content of a document the reader has no publish access to

Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read user-authored template documents that the REST API explicitly withholds from non-administrators, snippet source (JS/CSS), and the contents of the widgets, plugins and emoji directories. Where an export artifact exists under a derivable name, they can additionally retrieve exported content of documents outside their publish scope. Confidentiality-only.

Suggested fix

Apply the same treatment these routes' REST counterparts already receive: for non-administrator roles, enforce publish-access scoping plus IsSensitivePath and the refuseToAccess blocklist on the static routes, mirroring /assets/*. Alternatively, block /templates/, non-public /snippets/, and /export/ for reader roles entirely.