CVE-2026-69133 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-772 vulnerability in io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp. A fix is available for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: OHTTP codecs retain consumed outer cumulation buffers after completed exchanges
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary:
OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec retain the encrypted outer HttpContent in a handler-level cumulationBuffer. After a valid OHTTP exchange completes, the OHTTP request/response context is destroyed, but the outer cumulationBuffer is not released or reset. It remains referenced by the codec until a later inbound content frame replaces it or the handler is removed/channel is closed.
This can pin attacker-influenced pooled/direct buffer capacity on idle keep-alive channels. Across many long-lived idle connections, this can create availability pressure.
Affected components:
- codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java
- codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java
- codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java
Root cause:
OHttpClientCodec retains inbound content into a handler-level cumulationBuffer. On LastHttpContent, it destroys only the OHttpRequestResponseContextHolder. The cumulationBuffer is released in handlerRemoved(), not immediately after successful exchange completion.
OHttpServerCodec follows the same pattern: it retains inbound content into a handler-level cumulationBuffer, and on completed request/response it destroys the OHttpRequestResponseContext. The outer cumulationBuffer remains owned by the codec and is released only when the handler is removed.
OHttpRequestResponseContext.parse() consumes bytes from the caller-provided outer cumulation buffer, but its destroy() path releases only the inner binary HTTP cumulation, not the codec-level outer cumulationBuffer.
PoC:
A local test only:
codec-ohttp/src/test/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest.java
The test reuses existing OHTTP test helpers and BouncyCastle crypto provider to perform valid completed OHTTP exchanges over EmbeddedChannel pairs. It sends both a small and a large request/response exchange, confirms completion, then reflects the private cumulationBuffer field from both OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec.
Command:
./mvnw -pl codec-ohttp -Dtest=OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest -DfailIfNoTests=false test
Observed output:
small client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=1064 readerIndex=1064 writerIndex=1064 readableBytes=0
small server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=1110 readerIndex=1110 writerIndex=1110 readableBytes=0
large client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 readerIndex=131114 writerIndex=131114 readableBytes=0
large server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 readerIndex=131160 writerIndex=131160 readableBytes=0
small after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0
large after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0
Tests run: 1, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0
BUILD SUCCESS
Interpretation:
After completion, both the client and server cumulationBuffer objects have:
- refCnt=1
- readableBytes=0
- large retained capacity for the large exchange
- channel still open/active
- OHTTP context completed/destroyed
After channel close/handler removal, the previously retained buffers are released and their old refCnt values become 0.
Impact:
A peer can complete a large valid OHTTP request/response and keep the connection open. The codec retains the high-water outer cumulation buffer for the lifetime of the idle keep-alive channel, or until a later inbound content frame replaces it. Across many idle keep-alive channels, this can pin pooled/direct memory and create availability pressure.
This is not unbounded growth per exchange on a single channel. The more precise impact is connection-lifetime retention of the current consumed high-water outer cumulation buffer.
Suggested fix:
After successful LastHttpContent processing, release and reset the codec-level outer cumulationBuffer once parsing has consumed the complete message and no unread bytes remain.
Care is needed not to release the buffer if unread bytes remain for pipelined data. A safe fix would release/reset the outer cumulationBuffer in the completed-exchange path only when the parse consumed the full outer body.
Test environment:
- WSL Ubuntu
- Java 11
- Current main branch / 0.0.24.Final-SNAPSHOT
- PoC test used BouncyCastleOHttpCryptoProvider and existing OHttpCodecsTest helpers
Affected version testing:
The issue was reproduced on the following release tags:
- netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.20.Final
- netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.21.Final
- netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.22.Final
- netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.23.Final
It was also reproduced on main / 0.0.24.Final-SNAPSHOT.
For 0.0.20.Final through 0.0.23.Final, the PoC output consistently showed:
- large client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 ... readableBytes=0
- large server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 ... readableBytes=0
- large after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0
- BUILD SUCCESS
This confirms that completed exchanges leave the consumed outer cumulation buffer retained until channel/handler close in these versions.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp | ≥ 0.0.20.Final&&< 0.0.27.Final | 0.0.27.Finalio.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp:0.0.27.Final |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp to 0.0.27.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-69133 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-69133 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.