CVE-2026-68585 — kernel
Fix: siyuan-note/siyuan@ffde3b2CVE-2026-68585 is a CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel. A fix is available for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SiYuan before v3.7.3 Metadata Disclosure via getBlockInfo
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-68585.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-68585.
Summary
The /api/block/getBlockInfo endpoint returns document root metadata including the document title (rootTitle) for a block in a publish-forbidden document, with no publish-access check. Its sibling /api/block/getDocInfo applies the publish-access filter, getBlockInfo does not. Both are gated by CheckAuth only, so getBlockInfo is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
Details
The list/info side of this API is filtered while the block-info twin is not the asymmetry indicates an oversight rather than intended behavior:
| Endpoint | Returns | Publish-access filter | Route |
|---|---|---|---|
getDocInfo | document info/metadata | present | CheckAuth |
getBlockInfo | box, path, rootID, rootTitle, rootChildID, rootIcon | none | CheckAuth |
getBlockInfo takes a caller-supplied block ID, validates only its format, and returns the containing document's root metadata including rootTitle (the document title) with no IsReadOnlyRoleContext / publish-access check. Because getDocInfo performs the filtering for equivalent data, the boundary is clearly meant to apply here; getBlockInfo omits it.
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Setup: a publish-forbidden document D whose title is a unique marker, containing a block BLOCKID.
1. Mark the document publish-forbidden (admin action):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess
Authorization: Token <admin-token>
{"id":"DOC","visible":false,"password":"","disable":true}
2. Disclosure: the block-info endpoint returns the forbidden doc's title (anonymous, port 6808):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockInfo
{"id":"BLOCKID"}
Returns HTTP 200 with data.rootTitle set to the publish-forbidden document's title, along with box, path, rootID, and rootIcon. This document's title is not returned by the reader-facing filtered paths.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read the title and root metadata (notebook, path, root ID, icon) of a publish-forbidden document by supplying a block ID from it. This discloses the existence, title, and location of documents an administrator marked as excluded from publishing.
Precondition and scope (stated honestly): the request requires a block ID from the target document; this endpoint does not enumerate arbitrary documents. The disclosure is limited to document metadata, title, notebook, path, root ID, icon — not the document body. Block IDs for forbidden documents are obtainable from other CheckAuth-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (reported separately). Impact is confidentiality-only, limited to metadata; no content body, no modification. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.
Suggested fix
Apply the same publish-access check getDocInfo uses to getBlockInfo before returning root metadata, resolve the block's document and enforce IsReadOnlyRoleContext / the publish-access filter, consistent with the sibling endpoint.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | all versions | 0.0.0-20260721014951-ffde3b21eca4go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel@v0.0.0-20260721014951-ffde3b21eca4 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel to 0.0.0-20260721014951-ffde3b21eca4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-68585 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
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