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CVE-2026-64551

CVE-2026-64551 is a security vulnerability. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-64551 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause…

Published
Jul 27, 2026
Updated
Jul 27, 2026
Affected
0 pkgs
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness

When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header:

err   = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));

err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory.

sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded.

The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Vulnerability
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for the affected component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of the affected component has shipped for CVE-2026-64551 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-64551 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-64551. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header: err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data); stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err))); err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only require
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-64551 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-64551 across dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.