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🐧 Linux

CVE-2026-64389

HIGH

CVE-2026-64389 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in Kernel. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-64389 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key

Published
Jul 25, 2026
Updated
Jul 28, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐧Kernel

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Linux packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key

ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed.

With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_key before STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE is returned.

Relevant path:

smb2_sess_setup() -> conn->binding = true -> ntlm_authenticate() -> session_user() -> ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() -> ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() -> calc_ntlmv2_hash() -> hmac_md5_usingrawkey(..., sess->sess_key) -> crypto_memneq() returns mismatch -> KEY_XCH arc4_crypt(..., sess->sess_key, ...) -> out_err without expiring the binding session

Derive the base session key into a local buffer and copy it to sess->sess_key only after the proof matches. Return immediately on authentication failure so KEY_XCH is only processed after successful authentication.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐧LinuxKernel5.15.0&&< 6.18.406.18.40

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Kernel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update Kernel to 6.18.40 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-64389 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-64389 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-64389. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate NTLMv2 response before updating session key ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() derives the NTLMv2 session key into sess->sess_key before it verifies the NTLMv2 response. ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() then continues into KEY_XCH even when ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2() failed. With SMB3 multichannel binding, the failed authentication operates on an existing session and the session setup error path does not expire binding sessions. A client can send a binding session setup with a bad NT proof and KEY_XCH and still modify sess->sess_
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-64389 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-64389 across Linux dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.