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🐧 Linux
Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-64274

CVE-2026-64274 is a security vulnerability in Kernel. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-64274 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count

Published
Jul 25, 2026
Updated
Aug 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐧Kernel

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Linux packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count

goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer

u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS];

which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped:

ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f;

The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write.

Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐧LinuxKernel4.1.0&&< 5.10.2615.10.261

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Kernel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update Kernel to 5.10.261 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-64274 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-64274 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-64274. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTAC
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-64274 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-64274 across Linux dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.