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LOW severity

CVE-2026-62994 — coredns

LOWFix: coredns/coredns@ab318db

CVE-2026-62994 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-248 vulnerability in github.com/coredns/coredns. A fix is available for github.com/coredns/coredns — see the affected versions and patch details below.

CoreDNS `k8s_external` headless AXFR can emit an empty transfer batch that panics the `transfer` plugin

Also known asGHSA-74w3-63xv-x9mvGO-2026-6805
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-62994.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs39th percentile — riskier than 39% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.32%0.64%0.96%0.3%0.5%0.5%0.5%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-62994 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/coredns/coredns

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A network DNS client allowed to request AXFR for a CoreDNS zone can trigger a panic when CoreDNS is configured with k8s_external headless-service zone transfers and Kubernetes contains a headless service endpoint with no declared ports. The built-in k8s_external transferer can emit an empty []dns.RR batch, and the shared transfer plugin indexes records[0] without checking that the batch is non-empty. In normal CoreDNS mode the panic is recovered and returned as SERVFAIL, but repeated triggering can disrupt requests and amplify panic logging; if the debug plugin disables recovery, the same path can crash the CoreDNS process.

Details

plugin/transfer/transfer.go assumes that every Transferer emits only non-empty []dns.RR batches. During AXFR/IXFR response generation it indexes records[0] without checking the slice length:

  • plugin/transfer/transfer.go:129-131
for records := range pchan {
    if x, ok := records[0].(*dns.SOA); ok && soa == nil {
        soa = x
    }

The built-in k8s_external transferer violates that contract for headless services whose endpoints have no declared ports. plugin/k8s_external/transfer.go sends the SRV result slice unconditionally:

  • plugin/k8s_external/transfer.go:104-106
recs, _ := e.srv(ctx, svcs, s)
ch <- recs

plugin/k8s_external/msg_to_dns.go intentionally skips services whose port is -1:

  • plugin/k8s_external/msg_to_dns.go:107-112
for _, s := range services {
    // Don't add the entry if the port is -1 (invalid). The kubernetes plugin uses port -1 when a service/endpoint
    // does not have any declared ports.
    if s.Port == -1 {
        continue
    }

The Kubernetes EndpointSlice conversion creates that sentinel when an EndpointSlice has no ports:

  • plugin/kubernetes/object/endpoint.go:62-66
if len(ends.Ports) == 0 {
    // Add sentinel if there are no ports.
    e.Subsets[0].Ports = []EndpointPort{{Port: -1}}

This creates a built-in source-to-sink chain:

  1. Kubernetes EndpointSlice has ready addresses and no ports.
  2. CoreDNS kubernetes converts it to an endpoint with Port: -1.
  3. k8s_external with headless includes that service in transfer data.
  4. k8s_external.Transfer sends an empty SRV []dns.RR batch.
  5. transfer.ServeDNS indexes records[0] and panics.

Suggested remediation:

  1. In plugin/transfer/transfer.go, skip or reject empty records batches before indexing records[0].
  2. In plugin/k8s_external/transfer.go, only send recs when len(recs) > 0 in the headless endpoint and port/protocol paths.
  3. Add regression tests covering Port: -1 headless services and empty transfer batches.

Example consumer-side guard:

for records := range pchan {
    if len(records) == 0 {
        continue
    }
    if x, ok := records[0].(*dns.SOA); ok && soa == nil {
        soa = x
    }
    ...
}

PoC

Safe local unit-level reproduction was performed. It does not contact external infrastructure and does not require a live Kubernetes cluster.

Reproducer A: the transfer sink panics on an empty batch

A temporary package test was added under plugin/transfer:

package transfer

import (
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "testing"

    "github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/pkg/dnstest"
    "github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/test"

    "github.com/miekg/dns"
)

type auditEmptyBatchTransferer struct{}

func (auditEmptyBatchTransferer) Transfer(zone string, serial uint32) (<-chan []dns.RR, error) {
    if zone != "example.org." {
        return nil, ErrNotAuthoritative
    }
    ch := make(chan []dns.RR, 3)
    ch <- []dns.RR{test.SOA(fmt.Sprintf("%s 100 IN SOA ns.dns.%s hostmaster.%s %d 7200 1800 86400 100", zone, zone, zone, 1))}
    ch <- []dns.RR{}
    close(ch)
    return ch, nil
}

func TestAuditEmptyTransferBatchPanics(t *testing.T) {
    tr := &Transfer{
        Transferers: []Transferer{auditEmptyBatchTransferer{}},
        xfrs:        []*xfr{{Zones: []string{"example.org."}, to: []string{"*"}}},
    }

    req := new(dns.Msg)
    req.SetQuestion("example.org.", dns.TypeAXFR)
    rec := dnstest.NewRecorder(&test.ResponseWriter{TCP: true})

    defer func() {
        if rec := recover(); rec == nil {
            t.Fatal("expected empty transfer batch to panic")
        }
    }()

    _, _ = tr.ServeDNS(context.Background(), rec, req)
}

Verification command and result:

$ go test ./plugin/transfer -run TestAuditEmptyTransferBatchPanics -count=1 -v
=== RUN   TestAuditEmptyTransferBatchPanics
--- PASS: TestAuditEmptyTransferBatchPanics (0.00s)
PASS
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/transfer	0.005s

Reproducer B: the built-in k8s_external transferer emits the empty batch

A temporary package test was added under plugin/k8s_external:

package external

import (
    "testing"
    "time"

    "github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/etcd/msg"
    "github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/kubernetes"
    "github.com/coredns/coredns/request"

    "github.com/miekg/dns"
)

func TestAuditHeadlessNoPortTransferEmitsEmptyBatch(t *testing.T) {
    e := New()
    e.Zones = []string{"example.com."}
    e.headless = true
    e.externalAddrFunc = func(request.Request, bool) []dns.RR { return nil }
    e.externalSerialFunc = func(string) uint32 { return 1 }
    e.externalServicesFunc = func(string, bool) ([]msg.Service, map[string][]msg.Service) {
        return nil, map[string][]msg.Service{
            "/coredns/com/example/testns/headless/" + kubernetes.Endpoint: {{Host: "192.0.2.10", Port: -1, TTL: 5, Key: "/coredns/com/example/testns/headless/endpoint-a"}},
        }
    }

    ch, err := e.Transfer("example.com.", 0)
    if err != nil {
        t.Fatalf("Transfer returned error: %v", err)
    }

    deadline := time.After(time.Second)
    for {
        select {
        case batch, ok := <-ch:
            if !ok {
                t.Fatal("transfer closed before emitting an empty batch")
            }
            if len(batch) == 0 {
                return
            }
        case <-deadline:
            t.Fatal("timed out waiting for an empty batch")
        }
    }
}

Verification command and result:

$ go test ./plugin/k8s_external -run TestAuditHeadlessNoPortTransferEmitsEmptyBatch -count=1 -v
=== RUN   TestAuditHeadlessNoPortTransferEmitsEmptyBatch
--- PASS: TestAuditHeadlessNoPortTransferEmitsEmptyBatch (0.00s)
PASS
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/k8s_external	0.012s

Additional focused verification:

$ go test ./plugin/transfer ./plugin/k8s_external ./plugin/kubernetes -run 'TestAudit|^$' -count=1 -v
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/transfer	0.006s
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/k8s_external	0.013s
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/kubernetes	0.116s

Affected package suites:

$ go test ./plugin/transfer ./plugin/k8s_external ./plugin/kubernetes -count=1
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/transfer	0.010s
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/k8s_external	0.011s
ok  	github.com/coredns/coredns/plugin/kubernetes	0.194s

Impact

A network client allowed to request AXFR for the affected zone can trigger a panic in CoreDNS when all prerequisites are present.

Required configuration/state:

example.com:53 {
    kubernetes cluster.local
    k8s_external example.com {
        headless
    }
    transfer example.com {
        to *
    }
}

Additional prerequisite:

  • The Kubernetes API state contains a headless-service endpoint represented by an EndpointSlice with ready addresses and no ports, producing CoreDNS msg.Service{Port: -1}.

In normal CoreDNS mode, core/dnsserver/server.go:267-279 recovers the panic and returns SERVFAIL, so this is a request-level availability issue and panic/log amplification issue. If the debug plugin is enabled, the server disables the recovery path and this can crash the CoreDNS process.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/coredns/coredns≥ 1.9.4&&< 1.14.51.14.5go get github.com/coredns/coredns@v1.14.5

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
corednscoredns.io
≥ 1.9.4 && < 1.14.5
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/coredns/coredns, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/coredns/coredns to 1.14.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-62994 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatLow

This issue has a Low impact as it requires a specific CoreDNS configuration with k8s_external headless-service zone transfers and a Kubernetes headless service endpoint lacking declared ports. An attacker must send a crafted AXFR request to trigger a denial of service. The high attack complexity further reduces the…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-62994 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A network DNS client allowed to request AXFR for a CoreDNS zone can trigger a panic when CoreDNS is configured with `k8s_external` headless-service zone transfers and Kubernetes contains a headless service endpoint with no declared ports. The built-in `k8s_external` transferer can emit an empty `[]dns.RR` batch, and the shared `transfer` plugin indexes `records[0]` without checking that the batch is non-empty. In normal CoreDNS mode the panic is recovered and returned as `SERVFAIL`, but repeated triggering can disrupt requests and amplify panic logging; if the `debug` plugin disab
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-62994: coredns — Fixed in 1.14.5