CVE-2026-62337 — snark-verifier
Fix: axiom-crypto/halo2-lib@f53be09CVE-2026-62337 is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in snark-verifier. A fix is available for snark-verifier — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SNARK Verifier: Halo 2 aggregation mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-62337.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
snark-verifierReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Halo 2 aggregation circuit could mishandle proof elements encoded as the point at infinity.
When an assigned proof point appeared in an MSM term with constant scalar one, the Halo 2 loader used a scalar-one shortcut that passed the assigned point directly into the EC sum helper. The EC sum implementation used by that path assumed its inputs were non-identity points, while assigned proof points could represent the encoded identity (0, 0).
Details
EcPointLoader::multi_scalar_multiplication partitions MSM terms by scalar and base type. For (Value::Constant(ONE), Value::Assigned(_)), the loader placed the assigned base into the non-scaled variable-base list and later passed those points to sum_with_const.
The default Halo 2 shim delegates sum_with_const to halo2-lib EccChip::sum. In affected versions, that sum helper used incomplete affine addition and assumed that every input point was non-identity. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as (0, 0) could therefore enter the final aggregation sum through the scalar-one shortcut and affect the MSM or accumulator computation.
The issue was fixed in halo2-lib by updating EccChip::sum to treat encoded identity inputs as no-ops and to return (0, 0) when the total sum is the identity. This removes the non-identity input precondition from callers such as the Halo 2 aggregation loader.
Impact
Recursive aggregation circuits using the Halo 2 loader could compute an MSM or accumulator with an identity proof element in a path whose implementation assumed non-identity inputs. This breaks the expected handling of point-at-infinity proof elements in aggregation.
Practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks, so this is rated medium severity.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | snark-verifier | all versions | 0.2.6cargo update -p snark-verifier --precise 0.2.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for snark-verifier, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update snark-verifier to 0.2.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-62337 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-62337 in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.