CVE-2026-61647 — @roomi-fields/notebooklm-…
Fix: roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp@13828d9CVE-2026-61647 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp. A fix is available for @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-61647.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The vault_batch MCP tool (and the equivalent POST /batch-to-vault HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied vault_dir path that was passed directly to path.resolve() + fs.mkdir() with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write .md / .json answer files anywhere the server process can write.
The slug_prefix parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing / or .. could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.
Impact
File write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.
The vulnerability exists from v1.6.0 (when the HTTP /batch-to-vault endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic was exposed as the batch_to_vault MCP tool) through v2.0.2.
Patch
Fixed in v2.0.3:
- Opt-in containment via
NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOTenv var. When set,vault_diris resolved relative to that root andrealpath-based containment is enforced. Absolute paths or..segments outside the root are rejected with a clear error. slug_prefixis always sanitized. Path separators (/,\),..sequences and NUL bytes are stripped, length capped at 64 characters. This applies regardless of whetherNOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOTis set.- 15 unit tests in
src/__tests__/vault-writer.test.tscover the escape vectors (absolute paths, sibling-prefix attacks,..traversal, NUL/separator stripping).
Workarounds for users who cannot upgrade
- Run the MCP server under a dedicated unprivileged user with write access only to the intended vault directory.
- Do not expose the HTTP
/batch-to-vaultendpoint beyond localhost. - If using an LLM that ingests untrusted content, validate any
vault_dirarguments before forwarding them to the MCP.
Configuration requirement after upgrade (important)
v2.0.3 preserves the legacy unrestricted behaviour when NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT is unset, to keep existing single-user local setups working. To enable containment, set NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT in the server environment to a directory that should bound all vault writes.
Credit
Reported by @mcfly-zzh — thanks for the careful diagnosis and follow-up verification.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp | ≥ 1.6.0&&< 2.0.3 | 2.0.3npm install @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp@2.0.3 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp to 2.0.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-61647 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-61647 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.