CVE-2026-61429 — praisonaiagents
HIGHCVE-2026-61429 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in praisonaiagents. A fix is available for praisonaiagents — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-61429.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-61429 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
praisonaiagentsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The DNS-rebinding / redirect SSRF bypass in PRAI-05 is not limited to the httpx/urllib backend. When crawl4ai (headless Chromium via Playwright) is installed, web_crawl auto-selects provider=crawl4ai, and the headless browser re-resolves DNS and follows redirects on its own — with no per-connection SSRF guard. Runtime-confirmed read-back of the internal canary via both DNS rebinding and redirect (provider: "crawl4ai"). Status: runtime-confirmed addendum to PRAI-05.
Details
Affected component
- Package
praisonaiagents4.6.63. Backend selected whencrawl4ai+Playwright are installed. - Files:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py(_crawl_with_crawl4ai) andsrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py(standalone crawl wrappers).
Vulnerable code / root cause
Path:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py
Function:
_crawl_with_crawl4ai
Snippet:
async with AsyncWebCrawler() as crawler:
for url in urls:
result = await crawler.arun(url=url) # headless browser: re-resolves DNS, follows redirects
Path:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/crawl4ai_tools.py
Function:
Crawl4AITools.crawl / crawl4ai
Snippet:
result = await crawler.arun(url=url, config=config) # no _is_safe_crawl_url / no per-connect validation
Issue: the only SSRF check is the single pre-fetch _is_safe_crawl_url() on the initial URL string in web_crawl() (see PRAI-05). The headless browser then resolves and connects independently and follows redirects in-browser — no resolved-IP pinning, no per-hop/per-connect validation. Input (urls) is attacker/agent-controlled; the sink is crawler.arun(url=...); the guard is bypassed by DNS rebinding (TOCTOU) and by redirects (followed in-browser).
Attack flow / Why bypassed / Security boundary
Identical to PRAI-05: TOCTOU between the guard's resolution and the browser's connection; redirects followed in-browser; internal response returned as crawl content. See PRAI-05.
Proof of Concept
Environment
crawl4ai + Playwright Chromium installed in a dedicated runtime container (127.0.0.1:18081), same controlled internal canary + rebinding DNS. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.crawl.yml).
Steps to reproduce
SSRF-04-01-Crawl4AI-DNS-Rebind-Trigger→127.0.0.1:18081:
POST /tool/web_crawl HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18081
Content-Type: application/json
{"url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"}
- Redirect variant
SSRF-04-03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback:{"url":"http://redirector:8082/redirect-to-internal"}.
Expected result
The crawl backend refuses internal destinations regardless of DNS timing/redirects.
Actual result
HTTP 200, "provider":"crawl4ai", response content contains PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91 + FAKE_INTERNAL_TOKEN_DO_NOT_USE_7f3a91 for both the DNS-rebinding and the redirect payload.
Screenshots
Crawl4AI DNS rebinding read-back
The attacker-controlled rebind.lab URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed web_crawl endpoint. PraisonAI returns the internal canary response body containing PRAISONAI_INTERNAL_SECRET_CANARY_7f3a91.
Crawl4AI DNS rebinding runtime evidence
The runtime log shows the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend resolving rebind.lab to an internal Docker IP during the fetch phase. The internal canary receives GET /secret from a headless Chrome user agent.
Crawl4AI redirect read-back
The attacker-controlled redirector URL is accepted by the Crawl4AI-backed endpoint. PraisonAI follows the redirect and returns the internal canary response body.
<img width="1544" height="771" alt="03-Crawl4AI-Redirect-Readback" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7d05c8aa-5bda-45bc-b94c-bef0bdcf055c" />Crawl4AI redirect runtime evidence
The controlled redirector returns 302 -> http://internal-canary:8081/secret, and the internal canary receives GET /secret from the Crawl4AI/Chromium backend.
Impact
Same class as PRAI-05: read-back SSRF to internal/metadata services, now on the crawl4ai backend. Broadens the affected surface (the flaw is in the shared validate-without-pinning design, not one backend).
Suggested remediation
Resolve-once + IP-pin + per-connect validation must also cover the crawl4ai backend (constrain the headless browser to the validated IP, or allowlist crawl destinations).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | praisonaiagents | all versions | 1.6.78pip install --upgrade 'praisonaiagents==1.6.78' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonaiagents, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update praisonaiagents to 1.6.78 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-61429 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-61429 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.