CVE-2026-59226 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.1) CWE-285 vulnerability in open-webui. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-59226.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-59226 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
open-webuiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Title: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation
Summary
Open WebUI documents pending as a zero-access role used for new sign-ups and deactivated users, and normal HTTP routes enforce that with get_verified_user() (which rejects pending), while automation create/update/run routes additionally require the features.automations permission. Two paths missed that lifecycle gate, so a deactivated (pending) account could keep acting through the background automation scheduler:
- Scheduler did not re-gate the owner. When a stored automation became due,
execute_automation()rehydrated the owner withUsers.get_user_by_id(...)and re-entered the chat completion pipeline without re-checking that the owner was stilluser/adminor still heldfeatures.automations. A still-active automation therefore kept running after its owner was deactivated. - Model ACL only enforced for exact role
user.check_model_access()applied private-model grants only whenuser.role == "user", so apendingprincipal fell through a branch that denies a normal non-owneruser.
Net effect: a deactivated account could continue scheduled chat generation through the background worker, consuming the operator's configured model-provider credentials and reaching a stored automation model ID that its current role/ACL state would no longer permit through normal routes.
Impact
A pending/deactivated account continues to execute due scheduled automations after its access has been revoked, consuming the operator's provider credentials, quota and shared capacity, and bypassing the private-model ACL for the automation's stored model ID. Exploitation requires a previously created active automation and a later transition to pending (deactivation or approval rollback), so it is bounded and not interactive. It does not grant unauthenticated access, account takeover, code execution, or cross-user data exfiltration.
Patched
In 0.10.0:
execute_automation()aborts and records an error unless the rehydrated owner is stilluseroradminand (for non-admins) still holdsfeatures.automations, so a deactivated or de-permissioned owner's due automation no longer runs.check_model_access()enforces model ACLs for every non-admin role rather than only the exact roleuser, so apendingor otherwise unrecognised role no longer falls through.
Credits
@rexpository
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | ≥ 0.9.0&&< 0.10.0 | 0.10.0pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.10.0' |
Affected Products
open webuiopenwebuiDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.10.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-59226 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-59226 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.