CVE-2026-57132 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Improper Authentication vulnerability in praisonai. A fix is available for praisonai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-57132.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-57132 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 398,142 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
praisonaiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Setting PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled completely disables all authentication on the /api/v1/agents/{id}/invoke endpoint. This bypass is advertised in the application's own error messages, making it likely to appear in production Docker and Compose configurations.
Details
# src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py:32
_CALL_AUTH_DISABLED = os.getenv('PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH', '').lower() == 'disabled'
async def verify_token(...) -> None:
if _CALL_AUTH_DISABLED:
return # all authentication skipped unconditionally
The application's own error message advertises the bypass:
"Set CALL_SERVER_TOKEN or PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled to run without authentication."
This causes the setting to appear in Docker/Compose configurations as a convenience option.
Proof of Concept
import os
os.environ["PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH"] = "disabled"
# verify_token() now returns immediately for any request
# POST /api/v1/agents/any-agent/invoke → 200 OK (no token needed)
Common vulnerable deployment:
# docker-compose.yml
environment:
- PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled # auth completely disabled
Impact
Full unauthenticated access to the agent invocation API. Any agent registered on the server can be triggered without credentials, potentially executing arbitrary actions depending on the agent's configured tools.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | praisonai | all versions | 4.6.61pip install --upgrade 'praisonai==4.6.61' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update praisonai to 4.6.61 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-57132 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-57132 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.