How severe is CVE-2026-57124?

CVE-2026-57124 has a CVSS score of 9.8/10, rated CRITICAL. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2026-57124?

CVE-2026-57124 affects the following packages: praisonai (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix CVE-2026-57124?

Update praisonai to 4.6.59 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-57124 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2026-57124 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate CVE-2026-57124 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against CVE-2026-57124?

O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-57124 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is CVE-2026-57124 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2026-57124 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-57124?

CVE-2026-57124 is classified as OS Command Injection (CWE-78), Missing Authentication (CWE-306). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was CVE-2026-57124 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2026-57124 was published on June 18, 2026 and was last updated on July 23, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍

🐍 PyPI

Not in CISA KEV

CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-57124

CRITICAL

CVE-2026-57124 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) OS Command Injection vulnerability in praisonai. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-57124 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai

Also known asPYSEC-2026-3517

Published

Jun 18, 2026

Updated

Jul 23, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Jul 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-57124.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐍praisonai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands

Summary

PraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send POST /api/mcp/connect with a command and args field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user.

The issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (praisonai ui, praisonai ui agents, praisonai claw, and any app using praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app() / build_host_app()). praisonai ui and related Typer UI commands bind to 0.0.0.0 by default.

Affected Versions

Confirmed affected:

praisonai v4.6.48
Commit tested: d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
Tag tested: v4.6.48
Pinned UI dependency: aiui==0.3.121 from src/praisonai/uv.lock

Likely affected:

Any PraisonAI release that exposes aiui / praisonaiui create_app() through the PraisonAI UI host apps without authentication and includes the mcp dependency. I only confirmed the latest release during this audit.

Severity

Reasoning:

AV: the vulnerable endpoint is an HTTP API route.
AC: a single POST request is sufficient.
PR: default UI host apps do not require credentials unless opt-in auth is configured.
UI: no victim interaction is needed after the server is running.
S: code executes in the PraisonAI UI server process context.
C/I/A: arbitrary local command execution permits secret exfiltration, file tampering, and service disruption.

Root Cause

PraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras:

src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:11 includes base dependencies.
src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:19 includes mcp>=1.20.0.
src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:25 defines the ui extra with aiui>=0.3.121,<0.4.
src/praisonai/pyproject.toml:197 defines the claw extra with aiui[all]>=0.3.121,<0.4.

PraisonAI's UI commands bind externally by default and launch aiui run:

src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:114 sets host="0.0.0.0" for praisonai ui.
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:163 passes that host to aiui run.
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/ui.py:186, :204, and :222 also default subcommands to 0.0.0.0.
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:41 defines the full dashboard command.
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/claw.py:93 launches aiui run with the selected host.

PraisonAI's default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication:

src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:18 calls configure_host(...).
src/praisonai/praisonai/ui_chat/default_app.py:142 exports app = create_host_app().
src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:63 calls configure_host(...).
src/praisonai/praisonai/claw/default_app.py:128 exports app = create_host_app().
src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:174 imports praisonaiui.server.create_app.
src/praisonai/praisonai/integration/host_app.py:180 returns create_app().

In aiui==0.3.121, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in:

praisonaiui/server.py:1483 defines api_mcp_connect.
praisonaiui/server.py:1488 reads attacker-controlled JSON.
praisonaiui/server.py:1491 accepts either command or url.
praisonaiui/server.py:1496 calls connect_mcp_server(body).
praisonaiui/server.py:2516 defines create_app(..., require_auth=False, ...).
praisonaiui/server.py:2550 adds AuthEnforcementMiddleware, but it only enforces auth when AUTH_ENFORCE=true.
praisonaiui/server.py:2769 registers /api/mcp/servers.
praisonaiui/server.py:2770 registers /api/mcp/connect.

The MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch:

praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:325 defines connect_server(self, server_config).
praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:330 chooses stdio transport when command is present.
praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:332 constructs StdioMCPClient(command=server_config["command"], args=server_config.get("args", [])).
praisonaiui/features/mcp.py:360 calls client.connect(), which invokes the MCP stdio transport and starts the process.

Minimal PoC

PoC file: poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py

The PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute /usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials.

Observed output from the tested checkout with aiui==0.3.121 and mcp==1.25.0 available:

[19:19:55] server.py:229 WARNING No auth_token provided for Gateway server. Generated temporary token: gw_****650a. For production, set GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN.
[19:19:55] mcp.py:135 ERROR Failed to connect to MCP stdio server: 'tuple' object has no attribute 'initialize'
HTTP_STATUS= 200
RESPONSE= {"server":{"name":"poc-stdio-process-0","transport":"stdio","status":"error","tools":[],"last_error":"Connection failed"}}
SUCCESS_AT_ATTEMPT= 0
MARKER_EXISTS= True
MARKER_PATH= /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt

The MCP handshake fails because aiui==0.3.121 is not compatible with the locked mcp==1.25.0 return shape, but the attacker-selected process is already started. Process startup can race the immediate teardown caused by this version mismatch, so the checked-in PoC retries the same unauthenticated request until /usr/bin/touch wins scheduling and creates the marker. The marker file proves local command execution despite the reported MCP connection error.

Exploit Scenario

An operator runs:

pip install "praisonai[ui]"
praisonai ui

Because praisonai ui binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the generated app does not require authentication by default, any host that can reach the UI port can send:

POST /api/mcp/connect
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "name": "evil",
  "command": "/usr/bin/touch",
  "args": ["/tmp/pwned-by-ui-mcp"]
}

In a real attack, the command can be replaced with a shell, a credential exfiltration command, a file modification command, or a payload that starts a long-lived process as the PraisonAI UI server user.

Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis

Searched sources:

OSV query for PyPI praisonai: 51 advisories returned.
OSV query for PyPI aiui: 0 advisories returned.
OSV query for PyPI praisonaiui: 0 advisories returned.
GitHub Advisory Database search for exact /api/mcp/connect, api_mcp_connect, StdioMCPClient, connect_mcp_server, and praisonaiui.features.mcp.
NVD API searches for PraisonAI StdioMCPClient, PraisonAI api_mcp_connect, PraisonAI /api/mcp/connect, PraisonAIUI /api/mcp/connect, and aiui StdioMCPClient: 0 results.
GitHub issue/PR searches in MervinPraison/PraisonAI for exact endpoint/function/class terms. Only one unrelated PR was returned for /api/mcp/connect; no issue/PR matched api_mcp_connect, StdioMCPClient, connect_mcp_server, or praisonaiui.features.mcp.
Broad web searches for exact endpoint, file, class, and function terms returned no matching public vulnerability report.

Why this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories:

Not the excluded praisonai serve agents --api-key /agents auth bypass. This report targets POST /api/mcp/connect in the PraisonAIUI host app.
Not GHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7m / CVE-2026-34935 or GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j / CVE-2026-41497. Those involve MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command() command parsing. This finding uses praisonaiui.server.api_mcp_connect -> praisonaiui.features.mcp.connect_mcp_server -> StdioMCPClient.
Not GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq / CVE-2026-40159. That advisory concerns sensitive environment variables inherited by untrusted MCP subprocesses. This finding is unauthenticated network-triggered local process execution.
Not GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj or GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Those concern unauthenticated legacy/generated agent servers. This is a distinct UI route and a distinct sink that starts arbitrary local processes.
Not GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj, GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw, or other MCP server file-read/path-traversal advisories. This path is the UI MCP client connector, not PraisonAI's MCP server tool dispatcher.

Recommended Fix

Remove arbitrary command/args from the remote HTTP API. MCP stdio servers should be configured only from trusted local configuration, not caller-supplied JSON.
Require authentication and authorization on /api/mcp/connect, /api/mcp/disconnect/*, and /api/mcp/servers regardless of AUTH_ENFORCE.
Change UI command defaults from 0.0.0.0 to 127.0.0.1, or require an explicit --unsafe-expose style flag when binding externally without auth.
If remote MCP registration is a required feature, allow only URL-based transports with SSRF protections, or maintain an administrator-configured allowlist of commands.
Add regression tests that unauthenticated requests to /api/mcp/connect cannot start a subprocess, including when AUTH_ENFORCE is unset.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`praisonai`	all versions	4.6.59

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update praisonai to 4.6.59 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-57124 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-57124 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-57124. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands ## Summary PraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send `POST /api/mcp/connect` with a `command` and `args` field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user. The issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (`praisonai ui`, `praisonai ui agents`, `praisonai claw`, and

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-57124 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-57124 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works

CVSS Score

9.8/10CVSS v3 base

Vector breakdown

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Raw vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE Classification

CWE-78OS Command Injection CWE-306Missing Authentication

Weaponization

No known public exploit tooling found.

Timeline

Disclosed

Jun 18, 2026

Last updated

Jul 23, 2026

Identifiers

CVE-2026-57124

PYSEC-2026-3517

References

Webgithub.com Packagegithub.com

Related vulnerabilities

This CVE is critical severity; 2 of 8 other CVEs affecting praisonai are rated as high or higher (top: critical).

CVE-2026-56833CVE-2026-57145CVE-2026-57125CVE-2026-56836CVE-2026-56840CVE-2026-57144CVE-2026-57142CVE-2026-56832

Provenance

Sources

OSV.devNVDFIRST.org (EPSS)

Last verifiedJul 23, 2026

CVE-2026-57124

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

Real-World Exposure

Description

Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands

Summary

Affected Versions

Severity

Root Cause

Minimal PoC

Exploit Scenario

Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis

Recommended Fix

Affected Packages

Detection & mitigation playbook

Detect

Fix

Workarounds

How O3 protects you

Frequently Asked Questions

Is CVE-2026-57124 in your dependencies?