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CVE-2026-56258 — crawl4ai

Fix: unclecode/crawl4ai#3

CVE-2026-56258 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in crawl4ai. A fix is available for crawl4ai — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Crawl4AI - Arbitrary File Write via output_path Symlink and TOCTOU

Also known asGHSA-7cx2-g3h9-382pPYSEC-2026-228
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-56258.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs60th percentile — riskier than 60% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.16%0.57%0.99%1.41%0.7%0.7%0.9%0.9%0.9%Jul 26Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍crawl4ai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Three backward-compatible hardening fixes in the Docker API server. The headline issue is an arbitrary file write via the screenshot/PDF output_path.

1. Arbitrary file write via output_path symlink / TOCTOU (primary)

POST /screenshot and POST /pdf accept an output_path constrained to ALLOWED_OUTPUT_DIR by validate_output_path. The 0.8.7 check was string-only: it did not resolve symlinks, so a symlinked path component inside the output directory could redirect the write outside the directory, and the final open() followed symlinks. On a deployment where the runtime user can write executable/cron locations this is an arbitrary-write to code-execution primitive. The API is unauthenticated by default.

Fix: validate_output_path now resolves the real path (symlinks) of the parent and re-checks containment, and the write uses O_NOFOLLOW (write_output_file). output_path remains supported.

2. CRLF log injection (CWE-117)

User-controlled URLs/errors reflected into log lines could embed CR/LF and forge additional log entries. Fix: a logging filter strips CR/LF/control characters from all records.

3. Webhook request-header injection (CWE-93/CWE-113)

User-supplied webhook headers were sent verbatim, allowing CRLF and hop-by-hop / sensitive header injection on the outbound webhook request. Fix: webhook headers are validated (name pattern, no control characters, deny Host/Content-Length/Transfer-Encoding/Authorization/Cookie/...), with early request-time rejection.

Impact

Arbitrary file write (potential code execution) for #1; log forging for #2; request smuggling / header injection on outbound webhooks for #3.

Workarounds

  • Upgrade to the patched version.
  • Enable authentication (CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN).
  • Run the container with a read-only root filesystem.

Credits

Internal security audit (Crawl4AI maintainers).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIcrawl4aiall versions0.8.8pip install --upgrade 'crawl4ai==0.8.8'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
crawl4aikidocode
< 0.8.8
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for crawl4ai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update crawl4ai to 0.8.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-56258 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Three backward-compatible hardening fixes in the Docker API server. The headline issue is an arbitrary file write via the screenshot/PDF `output_path`. ### 1. Arbitrary file write via output_path symlink / TOCTOU (primary) `POST /screenshot` and `POST /pdf` accept an `output_path` constrained to `ALLOWED_OUTPUT_DIR` by `validate_output_path`. The 0.8.7 check was string-only: it did not resolve symlinks, so a symlinked path component inside the output directory could redirect the write outside the directory, and the final `open()` followed symlinks. On a deployment where the runt
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-56258: crawl4ai — Fixed in 0.8.8